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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Kalley Rae Aman for the
Master of Science in Political Science presented June 12,
1997.

Title:

The Minimal Role of Legal Traditions at the
International Court of Justice

International legal scholars and lawyers have
dedicated much thought and energy to enhancing their
understanding of how judges at the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) come to decide cases the way they do.
Although these studies of judicial behavior at the ICJ
have provided insight into international judicial
decision-making, still little is known about how
international judges reach decisions.
This project was an attempt to improve upon the
explanations, given thus far,

for the decisions made by

ICJ judges in the cases brought before the Court.

In this

study I tried to ascertain whether and to what extent the
legal tradition under which an ICJ justice has been
educated and trained to practice law determines how she or
he finds and applies the law in an international dispute.

I also sought to answer the following question: Do the
civil law and common law traditions differ in enough ways
or to such a great extent as to render them distinct from
one another?
I began by examining the world's three principal
legal traditions, civil law, common law, and socialist
law, according to three criteria common to
macrocomparative surveys on legal tradition: history, the
conception of law, and the institutional elements of a
legal system.
The decisions of three ICJ cases were analyzed with a
view to determining whether the justices voted along lines
of legal tradition and/or discovered and applied the law
in a manner typical of the legal tradition under which
they were educated.

From the analysis I concluded that

legal tradition was not a significant variable in the
judicial decision-making at the ICJ.

The examination of

the cases also indicated that the common law and civil law
traditions appear to converging in so far as they have
adopted the methods of the other tradition yet still
diverging as they continue to reveal traditional
differences.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
For years, legal scholars and others taking an
interest in law have theorized about how judges make
decisions.

Some have hypothesized that judges rule

according to their own political or social interests 1 ,
others have argued that judges allow only the law and
relevant legal principles to influence their legal
reasoning and decision-making in the cases that are
brought before them. 2

Still, many other writers have

suggested that it is a combination of factors, including
the judge's socio-economic background, his or her legal
education and political and social interests, and her or
his sense of responsibility to uphold the law that
contribute to the process of deciding a legal dispute. 3
Legal scholars and international lawyers have
dedicated much thought and energy to enhancing their
understanding of how judges at the International Court of
Justice come to decide cases the way they do. 4
Undoubtedly, few would find the reasons for these studies
surprising.

International lawyers, particularly those
1

who represent countries with disputes before the Court,
have an interest in understanding how the justices who
are deciding the cases will reach a conclusion about the
facts of the conflict and the law that governs it; the
better international laV\T}'ers can predict the way justices
will decide, the greater their hopes of reaching a
desirable outcome.
One might suppose also that legal scholars or
enthusiasts of international law seek knowledge of the
legal reasoning of ICJ judges so that they may improve
upon their explanations and predictions of ICJ decisions.
By gaining insight into the decision-making process at
the ICJ, scholars and enthusiasts of the law contribute
to their own pursuit of intellectual development and that
of the academic community.
This thesis endeavors to make such a contribution;
it is an attempt to improve upon the explanations, given
thus far,

for the decisions made by ICJ judges in the

cases brought before the Court.

As stated at the outset,

many arguments are advanced to explain judicial behavior.
However, when one looks toward the ICJ, one finds that
past studies have not shed enough light on the decision2

making process at the ICJ.

Little is yet known about how

international judges reach decisions.
In this thesis I will try to ascertain if and to
what extent the legal tradition under which an ICJ

justice has been educated and trained to practice law
determines how she or he finds and applies the law in an
international dispute.

This will be accomplished through

the case study method.

I have chosen three cases for

analysis:

The Right of Passage case (India v. Portugal) 5 ,

The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Denmark/The
Netherlands v. Germany) 6 , and The Case Concerning the
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) . 7
These three disputes were chosen from among the
roughly 76 contentious cases rendered by the ICJ because
they each represent a period of the Court's activity that
is distinguishable from the next.

Gary Scott and Karen

Csajko examined the history of the Court's activity and
found, based on the political and legal landscape since
the inception of the

ICJ, that its history could be

logically divided into three eras:

ICJ I

(1946 through

1962), ICJ II (1963 through 1985) and ICJ III (1986 to
present) . 8
3

These particular cases were chosen from the era they
represent because the decisions were the most divisive of
the period. 9

In other words, the decisions in these cases

were not only split, i.e. dissenting and separate
opinions were cast, but were widely split with, in some
cases, the majority of the justices opting out of the
Court's judgment through separate opinions, declarations,
or dissents.
I have chosen to analyze these decisions on the
basis of legal traditions for two reasons.

First, little

research has been done on the effect that legal education
and training has on the performance of ICJ justices.
Lyndell Prott offers a relatively brief investigation of
the influence of legal education on the judges; however,
his inquiry extends to only two cases and he chooses
these because they stand out as examples of this type of
influence. 10

In this project, I am attempting to improve

upon Prott's methodology so that I may draw informative
conclusions about the decision-making at the ICJ.
Second, it seems that inquiries into other factors
that are typically cited as significant variables in
judicial reasoning and decision-making, e.g. socio4

economic background of the judge, political interests,
and ethical or moral concerns, have not substantially
improved the understanding of scholars and lawyers on how
decisions are reached at the ICJ.

While much of the

research on judicial behavior at the ICJ is insightful
and enlightening, it still appears that not enough is
known about the process of reaching a judgment at the
World Court. 11
I should state at the outset that I do not propose
to draw grand conclusions about how judges at the ICJ
reach a judgment.

Instead, I will heed the advice of

experts in the field of judicial behavior who often issue
warnings about placing too much emphasis on one variable
or hastily separating one variable in the judicial
decision-making process from the multitude of potential
others.

One follower of the ICJ states the challenge

ahead of me nicely:
Naturally one cannot expect to determine in what
exact proportion each of these factors has
influenced the judge's thinking.
It would be rash
in the extreme to try to calculate the exact
proportion of each element of personal experience on
a judge's mentality, or to try to discover their
precise degree of influence on a particular decision
- such influence being essentially incalculable.
The aim of this analysis is only to expose thesefactors in the hope that this will create more
5

awareness of their influence. 12

WHAT IS A LEGAL TRADITION?

Simple observation teaches us that law varies across
the globe.

Legal principles, legal processes, legal

institutions, and legal structures all differ from one
political society to the next. 13

The divergence of law and

legal mechanisms is perhaps most visibly apparent in the
diversity of regional, national, and municipal laws in
force throughout the world. 14
Each sovereign state has, of course, its own
national legal system.

These legal systems are essential

for the maintenance of order in these states and remain a
cornerstone of their sovereignty.

Within these systems,

states enact laws and enforce them according to the
principles and procedures they desire.
Less observable is what is known as a legal
tradition.

Legal traditions encompass much more than the

laws and legal machinery of a single state.

As we will

see in the following pages, legal traditions provide the
broader theoretical framework for the discrete national
legal systems.

More specifically, they embody the

historical and cultural background within which groups,
6

whether states, localities, tribes, or collectivities,
approach and implement the law.

They are, as one

scholar has nicely put it,
.. a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of
law in the society and the polity, about the proper
organization and operation of a legal system, and
about the way law is or should be made, applied,
studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition
relates the legal system to the culture of which it
is a partial expression.
It puts the legal system
into cultural perspective . 15
A legal tradition, then,

11

is not a set of rules of

law about contracts, corporations, and er imes,

11

16

rather it

is a disposition towards law which is influenced and
informed by the culture in which it operates.

It is the

context under which specific rules of law are made and
implemented, thus the legal tradition is not only prior
to the rules about "contracts, corporations, and crimes"
but, more importantly, it is the theoretical point of
origin for these laws.
Craig Lawson offers a schema for simplifying legal
systems which may also serve as a useful aid for
understanding the idea of a legal tradition. 17

Using a

technique which often appears in macrocomparative
surveys, Lawson identifies four features that are
7

commonly used to compare legal traditions.

These are 1)

history;
2) conception of law; 3) structural elements of the
formal system of laws; and 4)
the legal system. 18

institutional elements of

Although I will not, at this point,

proceed to examine each legal tradition according to
these features,

it seems that by providing an explication

of each of these

four features,

one might gain a better

grasp on the notion of a legal tradition.

1.

History:

Each legal tradition has its own history,

that is, the ideas that we hold today towards law are not
entirely our own.

The history of a legal tradition is a

narrative of the ideas and events that have shaped the
contemporary legal system. John H. Merryman notes that
11

law is among other things, an expression of a culture;

ideas about law are part of the intellectual history of a
people.

1119

Granted, an exploration into the history of a

legal tradition may not directly tell us everything we
need to know about contemporary policies, laws, and legal
mechanisms,w but it does set the theoretical stage for the
contemporary legal situation.
8

2.

A Conception Of Law:

The second feature noted above

is not consciously developed by those who adhere to a
legal tradition. 21

As Lawson explains, a conception of law

can be defined as "an underlying set of assumptions about
the nature of law and its role in organizing social
life.

1122

It is a fundamental attitude towards law that is

both "predominant and historically deep-rooted.

1123

The

conception of law has overarching significance for legal
systems and those groups and individuals it governs since
it will "color all the workings of the legal order.

1124

The remaining two features reflect a concern with
less abstract aspects of a legal tradition.
3.

The Formal Elements Of A Legal System:

This

typically refers to the individual rules of law in legal
systems.

However, comparatists have found that the

organization of legal systems into larger groupings on
the basis of more general and structural elements is more
practical and, arguably, more valuable than comparing the
individual rules of a system. 25

"The similarity of rules

is in most cases an unreliable indicator of the
9

convergence or divergence of the legal system," Merryman
notes.

"The rule ordinarily symbolizes far more than its

bare text states.
11

1126

Rules do not say anything about

legal extension, legal penetration, legal culture, legal

structures, legal actors and legal processes.

1127

And as

Lawson points out, rules and doctrines are "the least
enduring and most superficial elements of legal systems.

1128

Brierly agrees, stating that "a system of law is
something more than merely the sum total of all the rules
valid in a given country and at any given time. " 29
Grouping legal systems into traditions involves taking
into consideration
11

11

constant elements" rather than the

less stable rules found in the law at any given moment.

1130

Hence, structural elements of legal systems are most
often chosen for the purposes of macrocomparative study
of legal traditions; these are considered to be enduring
elements of a legal system and reflect the continuity of
law. 31

The following structural elements are most often

chosen for the purposes of macrocomparative study:

the

major divisions or branches of a body of laws, its
fundamental or pervasive concepts, and its terminology. 32

10

4.
are

The Institutional Elements Of A Legal System:
11

the animating forces in a legal system.

1133

These

They

include the Courts, legislatures, associations of
lawyers, and other legal processes that can be found
within the legal structure. 34

In order to learn more about

a legal tradition, the comparatist might ask what role
legislatures play in the particular legal systems that
tradition governs.

Or she might make inquiries into the

part that lawyers and other advocates play in the legal
systems.

A legal tradition, then, is a narrative of a

culture's ideas and attitudes towards law and its role in
society.

These attitudes are reflected in the structure

of the legal system as well as its institutions.

To

build a legal system, a society must know in advance what
it wants from the rule of law; it must have formed an
idea of how law ought to be or is created; it must have a
conception of the type of relationship its members will
have with the law; and it must have some notion of how it
would like to see law implemented and enforced.

In

short, the society must have expectations about the
11

functions of the legal system and the principles upon
which it will operate.
But these expectations do not appear overnight, in
fact,

they can be traced back to ideas that are hundreds,
It is the history of these

even thousands of years old.

ideas, and the cultural context within which they are
developed, which forms the legal tradition and,
subsequently, the mindset with which a society approaches
the law.
LEGAL TRADITIONS AROUND THE WORLD

There are three principal legal traditions in the
world today: the civil law tradition, the common law
tradition and the socialist tradition of law. 35

The civil

law tradition is the dominant legal tradition in most
parts of Western Europe, all of Central and South
America, many parts of Asia and Africa and in a few
enclaves of the common law world - Quebec, Puerto Rico,
and Louisiana. 36

The United States, Great Britain,

Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all adhere to
the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition. 37

Parts of Asia and

Africa have also been substantially influenced by the
12

common law tradition. 38

The Socialist law tradition

operates in the states of the former Soviet Union and in
those Eastern European states that once constituted part
of the Soviet

Bloc.~

As we shall see, each of these three traditions is
of European origin.

Merryman explains that they are all

closely allied to the development of European
civilization. They express ideas and embody
institutions which have been formed in the Western
historical and cultural context.~

The civil law and common law traditions in particular
have developed in a similar historical and cultural
setting.

In fact, some comparatists argue that the

histories of these two traditions and the conceptions of
law they hold are so alike that to speak of them as two
distinct legal traditions is misleading. 41

If this is the

case, i.e. if the civil and common law traditions are
really one in the same except for some minor differences,
then this project is in jeopardy, for most of the judges
at the ICJ have been educated and trained under a common
law or civil law system.

In other words, if the legal

traditions do not diverge in ways that might matter to
13

the decision-making of justices, then this study seems
pointless.

However, the contention that the civil and

common law traditions share virtually all of their
fundamental characteristics and thus should not be
thought of as two distinct approaches to law is simply
that - a contention.

There are others who argue that the

traditions diverge in both subtle and explicit ways which
are reflected in the institutions, processes, and
structure of the legal

systems.~

In order to come to any conclusion about the
similarities or differences between legal traditions, an
examination of the traditions must be undertaken using a
defined set of criteria.

I will once again borrow the

criteria used by Lawson in his comparative study of civil
law and common law legal traditions: history, conception
of law, structural elements of the formal system of laws,
and institutional elements of the legal system. 43

Lawson

explains that the comparison of legal traditions involves
identifying particular features:
One must find a taxonomy which compares fundamental
features - those which are more likely to be
enduring and widely dispersed - and features which
broadly represent the range of laws and institutions
within a legal system.«
14

The four features proposed by Lawson are useful tools for
analysis; they provide enough generality to make possible
a comparison of what are potentially very diverse legal
traditions yet they establish fairly clear guidelines for
determining what can or cannot be incorporated into the
analysis. 45

In other words, comparison based on the four

features alone allows for manageability over a wealth of
information some of which is relevant to the analysis and
some of it not.

These features appear to be relevant to

the purpose of this project, i.e. determining the
influence of legal tradition on judicial decision-making
at the ICJ, for two reasons.

First, they comprise what

are the enduring and fundamental features of a legal
tradition.

As discussed above, comparatists agree that

an attempt at comparison of legal traditions based on
changing and unstable elements, for instance the
individual rules of legal systems, fails to satisfy the
standards of comparative scholarship. 46

Second,

application of the set of criteria proposed by Lawson to
this project makes it a manageable endeavor.
In my own analysis I will, however, omit the third
feature, structural elements of the formal system of
15

laws.

As discussed above, comparatists discourage

drawing conclusions about legal traditions or legal
systems from a comparison of the particular rules of a
legal system.

They argue that a more fruitful endeavor

would take into account the structural features of the
system.

But it seems that for the purpose of this

thesis, an exploration into structural features is
unnecessary; an analysis of the traditions based on the
other three features will suffice.
From the examination of the traditions we can
hopefully begin to find answers to two questions.

First,

do the traditions differ in enough ways or to such a
great extent as to render them distinct from one another?
Second, do the legal decisions at the ICJ reflect a
commitment to the principles and procedures of a legal
tradition and if so can legal education and training of
justices greatly enhance one's power to explain and
predict judicial decision-making at the ICJ?
Before turning to an examination of the civil law,
common law, and socialist law traditions, I would like to
point out that these are not the only legal traditions
represented throughout the world.
16

Other major religious

and nonwestern legal traditions include Islamic law,
Hindu law, Jewish law, Chinese and Japanese (and Korean)
law, and the variety of indigenous African legal
traditions usually summed up as African customary or
tribal law. 47

Although these nonwestern legal traditions

are of equal importance to the international legal
community and the ICJ as the Western legal traditions,
they will not be included in this study.

This

examination will encompass only civil law, common law,
and socialist law as the justices that have sat at the
ICJ have overwhelmingly been educated and trained under
one of the three Western legal traditions.
Finally, one caveat will be issued before proceeding
to the discussion of the legal traditions.

Setting aside

for the moment the question of whether or not the legal
traditions are truly distinct from one another, one must
still show caution when trying to place ideas, concepts,
institutions, structures, etc. into categories.
Taxonomies are useful for the purposes of explaining
phenomena; however, they do not exist apart from our
conception of that phenomena.

Legal traditions, then,

are a theoretical construct; they represent the scholar's
17

need to organize and understand phenomena.

In fact,

there is no such thing as the civil law system,
the common law system, or the socialist law system.
Rather, there are many different legal systems
within each of these three groups or families of
legal systems. But the fact that different legal
systems are grouped together under such a rubric
as "civil law," for example, indicates that
they have something in common, something that
distinguishes them from legal systems classified
as "common law" or "socialist law. " 48
It is to these commonalties between and among legal
systems that I now turn.

18

CHAPTER TWO

THE THREE PRINCIPAL LEGAL TRADITIONS:
CIVIL LAW, COMMON LAW, & SOCIALIST LAW

The student making a comparison of the
methods of legal thinking in the common
law and the civil law must be constantly
on his guard against one-sided views,
for they are too easily adopted by the
superficial observer in this area. 49
THE CIVIL LAW

HISTORY

The civil law tradition is the oldest of the three
principal legal traditions; it can be traced back to
Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis of the sixth century
A.D.~

In an effort to reclaim and reorganize the Roman

legal system, the Roman Emperor Justinian prepared an
authoritative text on the Roman Civil Law.

Although the

Corpus Juris Civilis was influential during the existence
of the Roman Empire, after the empire's dissolution it
fell into disuse until the renaissance of the 11th and
19

12th centuries.

Thus,

the birth of the civil law

tradition is typically considered to have been in the
middle ages with the revival of the Corpus Juris Civilis
by the legal scholars of the Renaissance.
The Corpus Juris Civilis became the primary subject
of study at the Italian legal universities, including
Bologna.

Merryman offers two reasons for the Italians'

fascination with Justinian's compilations.

First, the

Renaissance was marked by a heightened interest in the
Holy Roman Empire. 51

Since the Corpus Juris Civilis was

written by a Holy Roman Emperor, it was thought of as
"imperial legislation" conferred upon the people by the
authority of both the pope and the emperor. 52

Second, with

the renewed faith in the potential of reason, the twelfth
century Italians hailed the Corpus Juris Civilis as a
piece of "written reason", a work of intellect superior
to the laws established by the barbaric Germans. 53

The

prominence of the Corpus Juris Civilis rose as the legal
universities of Bologna and other Italian cities became
the foremost institutions for legal study. 54

As men from

all of Europe flocked to the Italian universities to
study law and then returned home to practice it, the
20

Corpus soon evolved into a body of law common among the
European nations.
Although the jus commune, as it is known,

was not a

uniform body of law applicable to all of the nations of
Europe, it was similar to the law of the Holy Roman
Empire in that it was created to overcome the diversities

across the continent."

It intended to provide jurists

with a common language and method which oriented them in
the search for just

solutions.~

As Rogowski phrases it,

"the civil law is not a distinct field of law, but an
umbrella concept for legal cultures on the European
continent ..

1157

The development of the jus commune was greatly
affected by the events that unfolded in European society
in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries.

The predominance

of Justinian's text diminished as the intellectual
revolution that framed the American and French
revolutions made its mark on the civil law.
The influence of the Enlightenment on the
development of the jus commune is apparent in changes
such as the glorification of the secular state, the
exaggerated emphasis on private property and liberty of
21

contract, the abolition of feudal obligations and
relationships, and nationalism. 58

The new found principles

of equality of persons and natural rights to property,
liberty and life reflect the enlightenment preoccupation
with secular natural law. 59

The fear of government

instilled by this movement and its valorization of
personal liberties is manifested in the principle of
separation of powers and, in France, in the limiting of
the role and power of the judiciary.~

Finally, the

rationalism prevalent in 18th century Europe is evidenced
in the codification of civil law into a "coherent,
systematic form. " 61
The nineteenth century witnessed a fragmentation of
the civil law, with the European states making national
law exclusive to their own states.

The civil codes

formulated by the European states, particularly France,
embodied principal concepts from Roman civil law.

To

this day, the sovereign states of Europe have distinct
national legal systems.

Nonetheless, the influence of

the jus commune is, according to some scholars,
undeniable:

22

But what binds such nations together is that
these indigenous legal institutions have been
combined with the form and substance of Roman
civil law, under the influence of the jus
commune. The Roman influence is very great;
the native legal contribution, while substantial,
is generally of subsidiary importance.
It does
not go to such matters as basic legal attitudes
and notions, or to the organization and style
of the legal order. These are drawn from the
older, more fully developed and sophisticated
Roman civil law tradition. 62

According to this view, the law of the individual
European states is first, a product of jus commune and
second, a creation of each of the states.

CONCEPTION OF THE LAW
As the historical survey indicated, the civil law
tradition was born out of the Renaissance scholars'
interest in an authoritative rule of law based on reason.
It was later reborn out of the Enlightenment thinkers'
excitement about natural law, the idea of equality of
persons, and again, reason.

Because of the persistent

commitment to principle and the human capacity to reason
evidenced in the history of the civil law, i t should come
as no surprise that civil law lawyers and scholars have
historically placed great faith in abstraction. 63
23

Law is, in the civil law world, a theoretical
enterprise and hence is often referred to as a "law of
scholars.

1164

Law is conceived of as a rational process;

logical, rigid and clear. 65

The codes embody this process,

they represent an attempt to "rationalize the answers and
anticipate legal problems before they arise.

1166

The codes

manifest the civilian lawyers' conception of law, they
are "the materialization of a legal philosophy" and a
"solidification of society's ever changing morals into a
fixed set of rules.

1167

The code, then,

is a construction of the mind designed to
impose a rational and well defined legal
order on a particular society ... what you
have is a snapshot, a frozen moment in
time, of your rights and obligations as
they apply to you and to your relations
with others and with society. 68
Civil law reasoning is deductive.

From the

materials of law {statutes, regulations, etc.) the
civilian lawyer deduces universal, inherent principles
and relationships. The legal process in civil law
countries is syllogistic; as one lawyer has noticed,
civilian law lawyers engage in what he calls "drawer
methodology.

1169

When thinking through a legal problem, one

element of reason leads logically to another and so forth
24

until the answer is found in the appropriate code. 70

The

process of legal reasoning is similar to pulling drawers,
one by one, until one drawer contains the answer to the
problem. 71
The civilian lawyer is not searching for the drawer
with the best answer.
right answer. 72

She or he is on a quest for the

In civil law, the lawyers do not search

for a partisan agreement, instead they search for the
general rule that governs the factual situation at issue. 73
Each adjudication involves the application of some
interpretation of the code to a particular set of facts. 74
Hence, the facts play a subsidiary role to the rule.
In fact,

the codes are intended to be fully comprehensive

so that the facts of the case don't preclude a rational
resolution:
legal technique involves the interpretation
of statutory texts, analysis of concrete
problems so as to "fit them into the system"
conceptually. 75

It is assumed in the civil law world that the written
codes contain the answer to a dispute and the goal of
those in the legal process is to find the answer that, on
principle, is the right one.

Indeed justice requires
25

that the civilian lawyer seek to refer facts back to
supposed universal principles.

INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A LOOK AT
LEGAL EDUCATION & TRAINING AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES

Legal Education:
What is perhaps most surprising to the common law
observer is that legal education in the civil law world
is a general education at an undergraduate university. 76
This observation is not unimportant, however, for as will
be shown,

the different contexts for earning a law degree

in common law and civil law countries signify even
greater differences between legal education under these
two traditions.
Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe point out that the
greatest divergence in the legal education of these two
traditions appears in the manner in which the student is
initiated into the study of law.

Mirjan Damaska

identifies three enduring features of a continental legal
education:

instruction in the grammar of law, a

presentation of the most important fields of law, and
26

training in legal reasoning. 77
The instruction in the grammar of law involves the
analysis of legal concepts followed by the creation of
more general concepts and then a study of the
relationship of these concepts. 78

It is a "step by step

conceptual digestion of the law that results in a network
of precise interrelated concepts, broad principles and
classificatory ideas.

1179

The panoramic presentation of the most important
fields of law, the second feature of legal education in
civil law countries, emphasizes not particular legal
facts but the abstract legal issues that worry civilian
lawyers and scholars.

Because the civil law legal

education is set in a general university and is
considered more of a general education than a
professional education, it is also more academic than
practice-oriented.

Instruction is more philosophic in

nature and less concerned with practical legal problems
and resolutions. 80

Students are introduced to the study of

law through a "systematic overview of the framework of
the entire legal system.

1181

Generally, instructors tend to be more concerned
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with substantive knowledge and information than
procedural questions. 82

Lecture is the primary method of

teaching law and class materials usually consist of
treatises and codes. 83

To the professor, a student's

sensitivity towards logical consistency over wide areas
of the law is an indication of a good lawyer in the
future.u

Law is regarded,

in varying degrees, as a

science with the professor knowing the truth and
imparting it to the students. 85
Students are taught patterns of legal reasoning
which correspond to the conception of law that
predominates in civil law legal systems.
States we have developed the phrase
lawyer

11

11

In the United

to think like a

to refer to a type of approach to a problem.

This phrase does not carry the same connotation in civil
law countries.

Students are taught not to problem-solve

and develop the best argument but to look for the correct
answer to the legal problem. 86

They are not instructed in

the art of argumentation; they are educated to reason
through the problem for its logical conclusion.
Merryman notes that the principal object of
scholarship in the civil law tradition is to build a
28

science or theory of law. 87

The legal education in civil

law societies is reflective of that objective.

As

Damaska observes, the lawyer educated on the continent
will see this objective betrayed with an emphasis on
factual questions and too much concern about justice in a
given case. 88

Thus, the practice of law is downplayed

during one's legal education and a comprehensive
understanding of the legal system and the principles upon
which it is founded are emphasized. 89
Upon graduation, the law graduate in a civil law
system has a number of options.

However if she or he

chooses to enter the legal profession as an attorney,
more practical training will be required. 90

Legal

education on the continent is not intended to prepare
students for life as a lawyer.

As was pointed out in the

examination, civil law is a "law of scholars

11

and the

legal education at the university perpetuates that
conception.
Role Of Judges:
Traditionally, the part that judges play in civil
law societies has been minimal in comparison with other
legal traditions. 91

The position has historically been a
29

bureaucratic one offering little flexibility or
creativity for its

holders.~

The civil law judge is

thought of as a civil servant with the duty of applying
the appropriate legislation to a legal conflict. 93

She or

he is part of a professional judiciary and is treated
with the same respect as other public

servants.~

A career in the professional judiciary can begin as
soon as one graduates from law school. 95

The process of

becoming a judge is relatively uncomplicated: one applies
for the position, takes state examinations, and, assuming
the application is accepted and the exams passed, becomes
a judge.%

Before long, she or he will be deciding minor

cases. 97
In civil law societies,

judicial decision has

involved little more than the application of a particular
written rule of law to the facts. 98

Thus the power of the

judge to influence the development of law has been
virtually absent.

In fact,

in civil law legal systems

judges are almost anonymous. 99

Working within a legal

tradition which valorizes the legal theory of scholars,
civil law judges look to the writings of academics for
arriving at decisions. 100

Academics interpret the law and
30

--~ ~--

---- ----- -- ........... ___

-~

-

judges, when adjudicating a dispute, look to these
interpretations and apply them accordingly. 101

The

authority to apply precedent to a pending legal dispute
is given to the judge only after the principles in the
precedent have "hardened into customary law.

11102

Judgments on the continent are not personalized and
are rarely divided.

As Zweigert and Kotz explain,

judgments
should primarily be impersonal acts of state
which parade the majesty of the law in front
of citizens in awe of authority . 103
I

The continental judge is'. discouraged from writing
dissenting opinions. 104

The judgment of the civil law

court is

considered authoritative, unquestionable, and

final . 105

Because each legal problem is supposed to have

one right answer, civil law societies value unanimous
court decisions.

Hohmann notes that there is a

reluctance in civil law countries to think of courts as
"participants in an ongoing debate 11 about legal problems
and their solutions. 106

He explains that the civil law

style is for decisions to flow from an impersonal,
unified authority . 107
According to Merryman, the process of judicial
31
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decision can be fit into a formal syllogism of scholastic
logic . 108

The code contains the major premise, the facts

of the case serve as the minor premise, and the
conclusion follows from the two.m

As he sees it, the

civil law judge is "an operator of a machine designed and
built by legislators" 110 ; she or he applies what others
create.

The others, Merryman argues, are the legislators

whose names we recognize (Justinian and Napoleon) and
scholars whose works we might have read (Gaius, Irnerius,
Bartolus, Mancini, Edomat, Pothier, Savigny) .m

Judges in

civil law countries have not enjoyed the same status as
these historic figures nor have they left a comparable
legacy in the civil law tradition. 112

THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
HISTORY
One third of the earth's population lives in a
region where common law has made its mark. 113

The

influence of common law is found in former British
colonies:

The United States, Australia, Canada, India,

Pakistan, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Gambia, Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. 114
32
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The origin of the common Law tradition is typically
traced back to A.D. 1066, the date of the Norman Invasion
when William I defeated the Anglo-Saxons in the Battle of
Hastings. 1 ~

David and Brierly note, however, that it is

not the actual act of conquest itself that altered the
history of English Law. 116

Instead, it was the strong,

centralized, and experienced administrative organization,
the

11

feudal pyramid

11

brought with the foreign occupation

that forever changed the course of the Anglo-Saxon legal
tradition. 117
In connection with the increase in royal power in
England that began with the reign of William I, the royal
courts of justice became vested with an unprecedented
ran~e

of jurisdiction which eventually included all of

England. 118

The king found that through an increase in the

voltlme of disputes decided by the royal judiciary, he
could increase profits for the kingdom, as litigants had
to pay court fees, while extending his power and
authority throughout the territory. 119

Empowered by the

King, this handful of royal courts with absolute
jurisdiction developed, through their rulings, new
procedures and new substantive law applicable to all
33
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This set of rules and laws came to be known

as the common law.
During what is known as the "Age of Reform",
philosopher Jeremy Bentham called for changes in the
common law system. 121

By the nineteenth century, the court

system in England had become disorganized with courts
claiming overlapping jurisdiction . 122

This disorganization

posed a major problem to the English legal system as it
was the judicial decisions, not legislation, which served
as the primary, and at that point in history the only
source of law.

The reform resulted in a transformation

of the court system in England.

A hierarchy of courts

was established and jurisdiction was divided among them
on the basis of particular areas of law. 123
As the nineteenth century approached its end,
several pieces of legislation were enacted in England
which covered specific areas of commercial

1

law. ~

These

"codifying statutes" were not comprehensive codes or
regulations embodying societal values.

Rather, they were

"orderly presentations of existing rules which had been
developed by the courts of common law.

11125

The legislation

represented in written form the precedents set by the
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courts.
To this day there is no comprehensive codification
of family law or the law of succession, law of contract
or law of torts in England. 126

The decisions of Courts

remain the primary source of law.

Historically, the

legislation that has been promulgated has dealt with very
specific questions rather than comprehensive areas of
law. 127

Further, these statutes are not revolutionary:

these statutes can only be understood against
the background of the unwritten common law,
for they use the concepts and categories
and invariably presuppose the rights and
doctrines which have been developed by the
Courts."

Like the states operating under the civil law
tradition, those countries besides England that adhere to
the common law tradition have put their own mark on their
legal system.

Although the English have historically

demonstrated a distaste for law based on legislation,
some common law countries, such as the United States rely
on both case law and statutes as their sources of law.
Nonetheless, case law still takes precedence over
legislation as the judges in the United States have the
authority to strike down legislation that runs counter to
35
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the Constitution or to judicial precedent.
Like the civil law tradition, then, the common law
is a type of jus commune that sets the parameters for how
a legal system which operates under its principles and
procedures can be constructed.

CONCEPTION OF LAW
As one comparatist has observed, the transition
from Roman law to English law represents the realization
by humans that we have limitations and are incapable of
answering the philosophical questions posed by Plato.
The common law embodies this resignation and its
followers,

instead of asking "What is justice?" and

striving to create law that manifests the answer, seek to
find the best possible solution for each dispute.rn
The principles of individualism and liberty stand
out as foundational to the common law project . 129
law favors rights rather than

dut~es,

Common

emancipation rather

than control and responsibility rather than paternalism. 130
Common law is valorized for its liberal spirit:
Englislunen have thought of the Common Law
as being the essential guarantee of freedom,
serving to protect the citizen against the
arbitrary inroads of absolute authority,
36
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a function of which on the continent is
performed by the Constitution. 131
Ironic as it may seem, the legal tradition that
originated under a powerful monarchy and gives
extraordinary power to judges to make law, is highly
suspicious of authority.

Common law follows from the

notion that individuals have a right to contract freely
and to procure property free from government intrusion. 132
The aim of common law has not been to craft a
comprehensive legal theory.

Since its inception, the

goal of common law actors has been to develop a
procedural network whereby discrete disputes between
conflicting interests could be resolved. 133

Common law has

historically been seen as being dominated by "procedural
thinking" and, as was pointed out above, concerns about
substantive law have been minimal compared to civil law
countries.

In fact, common law judges in England have

shown to be disdainful of social legislation. 134

In their

eyes, social change is to be effected through court
decisions. 135
Although the aversion for legislation displayed by
other common law states may not be as vehement as
England's, the United States, Canada, Australia and the
37

others still rely on precedent as the primary source of
law. 136

In these legal systems, the focus is on the facts

surrounding a particular dispute and the precedents are
categorized on the basis of such facts.m

Precedents are

the substance of analysis in common law legal systems and
law is of ten found through a knowledge of the facts of
cases. 13s

A lawyer or judge who wants to find out what

the law is on a particular matter looks for cases with
similar facts and determines what the court said, and
thus what precedent has been established. 139
So unlike its counterpart on the continent, the
common law tradition does not value law for its clarity,
its logic, or for its conformity with standards of
rationality.

Law is not always clear in the common law

world as it must be interpreted from court decisions
which, even when dealing with what appear to be similar
sets of facts, may contradict one another or apply
different reasoning.

Further complication arises out of

the reliance on the facts of the case.

Since each case

is unique but may share similar circumstances with
/

another, it becomes difficult to decide which cases are
analogous to one another.

The inevitable result of this
38
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process is disagreement in the legal community over how a
court decision ought to be interpreted, conflicting ideas
about which precedents are applicable to which cases, and
most importantly, different ideas of what the law truly
is.
Hence, in common law legal systems, law is conceived
of

as an exercise in argument with the best position

becoming law.

This is not to say that law in common law

states is devoid of principle.

The principles structure

the parameters for argument and indeed often form the
substance of it.

As was noted above, the liberty of the

individual is one principle that is presupposed in common
law legal systems.

Still, common law values the quest

for practical solutions to practical problems encountered
by free individuals; it is in this sense pragmatic. 140

It

does seek nor does it consider possible the quest for
answers to enduring questions on the nature of the just
society.
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INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A LOOK AT
LEGAL EDUCATION & TRAINING AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES

Legal Education:

As we have already observed, a civil law legal
education is offered at the undergraduate university.

In

common law societies, the path to earning a law degree is
quite different.

A law degree is earned in common law

societies by attending a law school - an independent
institute of higher education.

A juris doctoris is a

graduate degree which is earned after one is awarded an
undergraduate degree at a four-year university.

A legal

education is treated not as a general education but as·a
professional education that prepares the student for
legal practice. 141
Upon entering law school, a student of the common
law is typically instructed to read cases while paying
close attention to the facts . 142

Students are taught to

examine the facts with a view to identifying the
pertinent legal issues in the

case.~

After discovering

all of the legal issues, they are to determine what
precedent was established in the case and finally,

40

they

are taught how to analyze it. 1«

This is the common law

process of legal reasoning.
As one can see, legal reasoning in the common law is
an inductive process.

The law student begins with the

specific facts to arrive at the general

conclusion. 1 ~

The

facts direct students and practitioners to the law which
is most often found in law reports.

Though the process

has its own logic, it is not logical and rigid in the
sense that the law is in the civil law world.

The

precedents do not necessarily follow from the facts; as
stated earlier, one often finds conflicting precedents by
courts dealing with analogous factual situations.
Students of the common law are taught to be
pragmatic. They learn to ask,

"What did we do last time? 11

when searching for the law on a given issue.

The

classroom is more interactive than in the civil law
societies; there are typically fewer students in each
class and professors generally expect each student to
participate in class discussion. 146
Since the common law is not considered a
scholars

11

and is more often viewed as a

11

11

law of

law of lawyers

11
,

the professors and the lectures that they deliver are not
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valorized to the extent that they are in the civil law.
Law in these societies is made by court decisions and, as
many argue, lawyers.

While many scholars are lawyers,

their words are not perceived as creative of law as are
the words of the judges or lawyers.

Moreover, as was

previously pointed out, professors most often teach the
law by analyzing the work of legal practitioners and
reading case decisions.

It is less often that law school

courses stress an academic orientation towards law.
Because of the emphasis on the resolution of
concrete, contemporary problems, the student with an
acute ability for finding legal solutions to current
conflicts is sure to succeed at law school.

By acquiring

the analytic skills essential to common law legal
reasoning and applying them to concrete problems he or
she is becoming prepared to practice law.

That is

precisely what a common law legal education aims to do educate students about the law and train them to practice
it.

Role of the Judge:

One comparatist has remarked that the common law
42

11

judge is

the oracle of the law.

11147

Another has referred

to common law judges as somewhat of a
even a

11

father figure 11

•

148

11

culture hero",

These phrases and comparisons

indicate that the common law judge is an influential
figure in the legal system.
Indeed the common law judge is often a well-known
figure.

She or he usually has had a successful career as

an attorney and is regarded highly among her or his
colleagues. 149

Appointment to the bench varies from state

to state, however the appointee is typically a highly
competent and experienced legal practitioner. 150

Once

appointed to the bench, common law judges, particularly
those in England, find themselves in an astonishing
position in both the legal system and society . 151

They

enjoy a relatively high degree of independence from both
the other limbs of the government and their fellow
judges. 152

The common law judges are encouraged to think

for themselves and to deliver their own opinions,
concurring or dissenting, in the event that they find the
unsatisfactory the judgment delivered by the majority of
the court.

These separate and dissenting opinions are

valuable because they have the potential, with the
43

changes in society or in a court's composition, to become
law in the future.
In a common law legal system law develops with court
decisions; common law essentially means the law created
and molded by judges. 153

It is conceivable that what is

law today may be replaced by a new law tomorrow. 154

The

role of common law judges is not only interpretive but
creative.

In common law'countries like the United States

where codes have been developed and a constitution is in
place, the judges are often asked to interpret the
written documents.

However, what is often referred to as

an interpretation of law becomes creative of law as
judges decide what vague or ambiguous legislation means. 155
Common law judges create the law by first, resolving a
question that arises from a specific factual situation
and second, making their decision binding on future cases
with similar sets of facts. 156
As statutes in common law states are typically
narrow and directed towards simplistic matters, common
law judges attach lower value to them. 157

Precedents, on

the other hand, represent the materials of argument and

44

it is to them that lawyers and judges typically look to
for law.

ARE THE CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS CONVERGING?

I began this chapter with a quotation about the
danger of taking one-sided views when comparing methods
of legal thinking.

One might argue that I failed to heed

my own advice in the foregoing discussion of the two
dominant legal traditions.

However, as I

stated in the

introduction, the presentation of the traditions intended
to highlight those features that are enduring and that
make the traditions distinct from one another.

As in any

comparison of this kind, one must take ipto consideration
that there are anomalies in each system and that
transformations in society may affect transformations in
the legal systems and ultimately the legal traditions.
Thus there are few absolutes in either of the legal
traditions.
Recently, a controversy has been sparked by those
who contend that the civil law and common law legal
traditions are not as divergent as was once believed.w
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These individuals argue that the distinction made between
the two traditions regarding the reliance on case law
versus codes is no longer relevant.

They cite an

expansion of the function of judges in civil law
societies as evidence for the convergence:
As legislators are becoming overtaxed by
the novel problems in life and the civil
and commercial codes on the Continent grow
more out-dated, these countries are more
and more turning to case-law to resolve
disputes. 159

On the other hand, common law states appear to be moving
in the opposite direction.

Zweigert and Kotz note that

these states are increasingly looking to legislators to
deal with questions that are obscured by case law. 160
Garner observes that on the matter of the sources of law,
common law and civil law societies
may prima facie appear.

11161

11

are not so diverse as

Finally, Aldisert notices that

the United States has borrowed from the civil law
tradition the reliance on

~odes

and statutes as sources

of law. 162
Craig Lawson argues that the similarities go even
deeper than the case law/code distinction.

He maintains

that civil law and common law states both developed out
46

of

Western conception of law and hence share ideas about

the place of law in the social order, the form of law,
the application of law, and the substance of law. 163

He

points out that both the civil and common law traditions
view minimum interference with individual freedom as the
single greatest object of the rule of law.

Individualism

and liberty are cardinal principles of both common and
civil law thought, hence the interests and needs of the
free individual are favored over those of the larger
group. 164

Lawson further observes that law occupies a

primary place in the social order in both legal
traditions and applies equally to all persons regardless
of their race, color, gender, ethnicity, etc. 165
Finally, the two traditions share fundamental legal
concepts including consent, obligation, rights, person,
fact, exception, interest, and so on. 166

Lawson's

observations lead him to conclude that the two
traditions, common law and civil law, should be thought
of as related members of a larger Western liberal
democratic traditions. 167

The common law and civil law

legal traditions share important fundamental concepts and
practices yet are distinct families within the larger
47

tradition of Western legalism.
Merryman agrees that there are similarities between
the common law and the civil law about the conception of
law but believes that they have a more recent origin. 168
He argues that developments in national and regional
legal systems illustrate

11

a growing consensus about the

law's proper extension within the society 11 and indicate
11

an increasingly common legal culture - a broader sharing

of basic attitudes about the nature of law and the proper
design and operation of the legal system.

11169

As he sees

it, the interests of states have begun to converge and in
this process,

states have agreed that law is the proper

mechanism for protecting or advancing those shared
interests.

As law becomes more universal, the

differences between common law and civil law begin to
fade.
Glendon points out that changes are occurring in the
legal education of the two traditions as law schools and
universities try to establish a better balance between
theory and practice. 170

She presents an argument in

support of the claim that convergence in legal education
will eventually affect convergence between legal
48
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traditions. 171
While these observations would likely heighten one's
doubts about the divergence of the common law and civil
law traditions, it is equally important to point out that
each of these scholars recognizes the enduring and
significant differences between the two traditions.
Merryman, for instance, sees the convergence of state
interests and the common and civil law legal systems as
threatened by an increasing divergence on the
international scene between states with strong parochial
interests. 172

As law is an expression of its culture, the

political divergence is ultimately reflected in the legal
sys tern. 173 ·
Aldisert recommends that his observation about the
United States' increasing utilization of codes be
considered in light of the fact that a conception of what
a code is and the functions it should perform in the
legal process are two different things in the United
States and in France. 174
Craig Lawson also states that an understanding of
his argument for considering the legal traditions similar
should take into account the lasting differences.
49
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points out that the case analysis method in common law
still receives

much emphasis and that the civil law

relies heavily on statutory interpretation . 175
Additionally, the professional cultures of these two
systems, particularly the role of the judges, remain
distinct.m

In fact he contends that the role of the

judiciary is the most distinguishing feature of these two
legal traditions and that the stark difference I
discussed above still remain. 177

He also notes that legal

reasoning and legal education in the two traditions
remain significantly different . 178
Zweigert and Kotz also warn students of comparative
law not to overemphasize the apparent convergence between
the dominant Western legal families.
civil law societies

11

They argue that in

the processes of law, especially

court decisions still cling to traditional styles and
forms.

11179

Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe agree with Lawson,

Zweigert, and Kotz that significant differences between
the two traditions remain more in the area of "mental
processes, styles of argumentation, and in the
organization and methodology of law than in positive
legal norms .

11180
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Lastly, Zweigert and Kotz contend that the question
of whether or not the two traditions are converging on
whether statute or judicial decision is the primary
source of law isn't a very interesting one. 181

The more

important question is whether in arriving at a decision
in a case, judges in common law societies and civil law
societies use different methods of finding and applying
law. 182

Zweigert and Kotz seem to think that they do:

Given that the development of political ideas
and institutions in Western Europe was quite
different from that in England and that in
consequence the standing of the judge, the
role of the advocate, the methods of legal
education, and the forms of procedure all
differed widely, it will come as no surprise
that the techniques of discovering and applying the law, indeed the typical methods of
legal thought as a whole, have developed very
differently. 183

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

Very little has been written on how the common and
civil law traditions view·international law.

Perhaps

If it is the case that both

there is a reason for this.

the common law and civil law traditions are structured
51
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according to basic principles of Western legal thought
like freedom,

individualism, rights and obligations, then

we can expect that a judge on the World Court educated
under the civil law tradition and another judge on the
World Court educated under the common law would possess a
similar understanding of these ideals and their relation
to the social order.

This is not to say that the two

judges would agree on the precise meaning of these terms
when applied to a set of facts or that they would share
similar attitudes toward these legal ideals.

Rather it

is to say, like the scholars above, that these judges
would assume a similar social order, a similar role for
law, and a similar set of legal norms.

In short, they

would approach an international legal dispute from the
perspective of the Western legal tradition which
emphasizes individualism, freedom from state intrusion,
and the possession of rights and correlative duties.
These expectations are further justified by the
fact that international law is a creation of Western
legal minds.

International law is founded upon the same

basic principles as common law and, even more so, civil
law, and in this century the international legal
52
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structure has been developed by civil and common law
legal scholars.

One can observe the fundamental ideals

of individualism and freedom that are central to those
traditions given expression in international law through
concepts like state sovereignty.

Hence, if we accept the

analysis of comparatists, international law most likely
shares with the common and civil law traditions the
enduring, fundamental similarities of all Western legal
families and is most likely viewed by both common and
civil law judges alike through the lens of Western legal
thought.
The divergence between the corrunon and civil law
traditions on the matter of legal education, legal
reasoning, the role of the judge, and the sources of law
would, on the other hand, appear to have consequences for
international law.

The comparatists agree that the

Western legal framework is shared by common law and civil
law students, however, they also agree that differences
endure.

Alice Erh-Soon Taj elucidates the differences

between common and civil law that she finds significant
to the internationalization of law . 184

She avers that

common law "recognizes the need to balance and weigh many
53

factors in doing justice according to law:

the law and

principles of law, past discussions and decisions, moral
sentiments and standards of behavior to be found in the
relevant community, expectations and aversions that may
reasonably be expected to govern the behavior of people
at particular times and in particular circumstances,
considerations of welfare and ability, of public policy
and interest and more recently of social justice.

11185

Civil law instead relies on open-ended concepts like
"fair, reasonable, proper, sound, common-sensical and
just.

11186

Erh-Soon' s analysis can be understood as

implying that judicial decision at the level of
international law would be very different depending on
the legal tradition, common law or civil law, with which
a dispute is approached.
It seems logical to suppose that the divergences
identified by Erh-Soon and all the other comparatists
would continue to be played out at the World Court, where
justices of these differing traditions adjudicate
disputes.

Although international law does have a

procedure and substance all its own, judges come to the
Court with an education in the law and a history of
54
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approaching the law in a particular fashion.

One can

expect that these habits do not fade away once an
individual has become an international judge.

Indeed the

absence of an international legal tradition that educates
and trains its students like the common and civil law
legal traditions necessitates recourse to those
established traditions or whatever other approaches one
might employ for reasoning through the legal dilemma. 187
Moreover, the purpose of this project is to
determine the effect of legal tradition on a judge's
discovery and application of the law.

Thus, the

supposition made here is that legal tradition,
particularly the legal education and the role of the
judge within that tradition, matters to judicial decision
in domestic law and therefore might matter to judicial
decision in international law since the justices take to
the World Court their own education and training.
The analysis of the decisions at the ICJ may not end
the debate over whether the common law and civil law
traditions are converging.

However, it will focus on the

methods used by the judges for applying and finding the
law and through this process hopefully shed some light on
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THE SOCIALIST LEGAL TRADITION

History
The eighty year old socialist law tradition is young
compared to its counterparts in other areas of the
world. 188

Although the Marxist philosophy upon which it is

based originated a century earlier, it wasn't until the
1917

October Revolution in the former Soviet Union that

a socialist legal tradition began to form.

189

Since that

date, socialist law has been distributed to many other
countries outside the former Soviet Union including
China, Poland, Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, Albania, East
Germany and Czechoslovakia. 190
As stated in the first Chapter, socialist law is
part of a larger Western legal tradition.

Socialist law

"exists within the family of civil law systems" but is
infused with Marxist-Leninist ideology . 191

This may seem

surprising given that classical Marxists have
traditionally had no use for the law and have viewed it
as an instrument of exploitation. 192

"Socialist legality"

didn't come into force, however, until after a struggle,
56

lasting from about 1917 through 1921, between, on the one
hand, Soviet jurist E.B. Pashukanis and other classical
Marxists who thought that law would wither away under
Socialism, and on the other hand, those in the Communist
Party, led by Andrei Vyshinsky, who wanted to use the
rule of law to facilitate the Marxist path to Communism.
With Stalin's official support, victory came to
Vyshinsky and the others who wanted to build a socialist
theory of law.

Stalin too believed that the rule of law

could facilitate the betterment of humankind and thus the
Soviets' transition to Communist society. 193

Hence, he

followed the lead of other European leaders who had
established Western codes of law with the purpose of
centralizing

power.~ 4

Because of his acceptance of

Western legal thought and the promulgation of a
constitution of 1936 in addition to a set of civil and
criminal codes, scholars have referred to Stalin as the
11

true father of modern Soviet law.

be somewhat misleading.

11195

But this title may

Since he eventually used it as a

tool for legitimizing and facilitating his infamous
"reign of terror", Stalin's commitment to a Western legal
tradition and the rule of law appears disingenuous.
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The Soviet Union underwent momentous legal reform
under its next leader, Nikita Kruschev.

By the time of

his death in 1964, the Soviet Union had codified a
substantial amount of legislation, civil and criminal,
and had replaced the facade of law created by Stalin with
a rule of law created, implemented, and enforced by the
Communist Party. 196

The Soviet Union, then, from the late

1950's to the mid 1960's, saw the development of a
"Socialist legality" but with a methodology and
infrastructure based on the civil law tradition. 197
As in the civil law tradition, legislation was and
continues to be the primary source of law.

Judges under

the socialist tradition enjoy even less independence than
those in the civil law tradition and their teachings and
writings are not considered law-making. 198

The following

list of secondary sources of law in the Socialist legal
tradition indicates that civil law and socialist law are
significantly different; they are uniquely socialist:
acts of social organizations, acts of state abitrazh
(networks of tribunals having exclusive jurisdiction over
economic disputes between the state and other
enterprises), acts of military commands, court judgments,
58
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and Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
The leadership of Leonid Breshnev contributed to the
development of a Socialist legality rooted in civil law.
Under his rule, the Constitution of 1977 was promulgated,
many of the existing codes were modified, and new
legislation was enacted.

199

Further developments occurred under Mikhail
Gorbachev.

The structural transformations he initiated

in the Soviet Union involved, among other things,
empowering the Socialist legal system to assist in the
implementation of the policies introduced by Perestroika.
One scholar, writing in 1986, observed that "Today's
Socialist legality, incessantly proclaimed as the means
of modeling society and educating its citizenry,
facilitates improvements in the legal system, legal
profession, and legal education ... the present Soviet
regime relies on law to legitimize and stabilize a very
unrevolutionary, even conservative regime.

11200

Although the legal system appears to have been
gradually given more legitimacy and power since 1917,
traditionally the Communist party leaders have steered
the course for both the state and socialist legality.
59

In

------~

__

...

__ _

fact,

the legal system in Socialist society must be

understood as inseparable from the State.

The Socialist

conception of law demands that the legal system further
the interests of the State.

CONCEPTION OF THE LAW
Again, Socialist law is founded upon the ideology
of Marxism-Leninism.

It begins with the assumption that

legal relationships and forms of state have their roots
in the material conditions of life.

A rather lengthy

quotation from Marx provides a succinct explanation of
the essence of he and Engels' philosophy:

In the social production of their lives people
enter into definite and necessary· relationships
which are independent of their will - production
relationships, which correspond to the definite
degree to which their material productive
powers have developed. The totality of these
production relationships constitutes the
economic structure of society, the real basis
upon which is built the juridical and political
superstructure and to which definite forms of
social consciousness correspond. The means of
production of material life condition the
social, political, and spiritual processes of
life in general." 200

The writings of Andrei Vyshinsky provide further
insight into the Marxist-Leninist conception of law, or
60
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perhaps more appropriately phrased
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11

Socialist legality 11

•

He explains that law is one of the superstructures
forming the society's economic structure and that law
11

depends on and is generated by production

relationships.

11202

In a capitalist society law expresses

the will of those who dominate - the capitalists.

It is

one of the tools the bourgeoisie class employs in its
effort to oppress and exploit the productive masses.
"Law is merely the will of the dominant class, elevated
into a statute.

11203

Socialist law, however, serves an entirely different
purpose.

It "protects the interests of the toiling

masses, who have been emancipated from exploitation and
the weight of capitalism.

11204

Socialist law, then, cannot

be understood apart from the Socialist state.
to Vyshinsky,

11

According

law draws its force and obtains its

content from the state 11205 ,

thus the ends of Socialist law

are the ends of the Socialist state as defined by the
Communist Party:

* the elimination of exploitation and social inequality
* the distribution of resources in proportion to labor
* the guarantee to each individual full exercise of
61
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Vyshinsky acknowledges Socialist legality's civil law
roots.

He points out that soviet law is made up of the

Corpus Juris Romani -"the gospel of Capitalist society"but insists that it has been infused with "the
revolutionary legal consciousness of the masses.

11207

According to Socialists, the Socialist legal system
is designed to fulfill its mission of total
reorganization of society. 208

It champions state ownership

of land and of the dominant means of production and only
grudgingly tolerates even the most minor instances of
private ownership. 209

It upholds national economic

planning and absolute fidelity to Soviet leadership. 210
Finally, it seeks to mobilize the citizens for a united
movement towards the ideal society. 211
This last goal illuminates the spiritual dimension
of Socialist legality and of Marx's philosophy in
general.
aspect as

Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe refer to this
11

the theology of Socialist law.

spiritual ideology,

11

11212

Marxism is a

a philosophy whose basic task is the

fundamental remaking of the conscience of the people.
62
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Stated in very simplistic terms, Socialist legality
is an all-encompassing ideology that seeks to replace the
capitalist economic structure with, first, Socialism, and
ultimately, Communism; law in a Socialist state has a
facilitative function.

But, as Zweigert and Kotz have

observed, Socialist law also intends to be educational.
Through consciousness-raising of the masses, the
production relationships that exist under capitalism will
be overthrown and supplanted with collective ownership of
resources.

Law operates to further the Socialist cause

and it is intended to teach the transgressor how to live
according to the principles of Socialism.

The single

guiding principle of Socialist law is Socialism and law's
function is understandable only in light of Socialist
ideology.

INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM:

A

LOOK AT LEGAL EDUCATION & TRAINING AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES

Legal Education:
Immediately following the October Revolution, the
Soviet system of legal education underwent massive
63
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The first step made by the Communist Party was

to, in 1918, open up university law faculties to all who
applied. 214

In 1919, the decision was made by Soviet

authorities to send legal personnel to the European
continent for education and training. 215

As this was the

era of "legal nihilism", the traditional institutions for
legal education, known as university law faculties, were
replaced with faculties of social science and an academic
education was stressed over a legal one. 216

Subsequently,

law school enrollment dropped dramatically in the 1920's.
When Vyshinsky's "Socialist legality" was officially
approved by Stalin, legal study was reinstated and the
university law faculties reopened. 217

Since that time,

though, enrollment at law schools has been kept at a
minimum.

Although socialist legality had been embraced

by the Communist Party and is, at the present,
increasingly becoming a significant dimension of
Socialist rule,

the Communist Party has consistently

kept the number of lawyers in society at a minimum. 218
Those individuals who have been given the
opportunity to earn a law degree in the Soviet Union
completed either a four year or five year program at a
64
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university law faculty . 219

The courses the students are

required to take are similar to, at least prima facie,
those offered in the other traditions we have examined:
legal and governmental theory, legal and governmental
history, governmental law and Soviet structure,
Administrative and Financial Law, International Law,
Civil Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, The Civil Trial,
The Criminal Trial, Penology, and Labor Law. 220
Considering its origin in civil law, it is not
surprising that a Socialist legal education is in many
ways similar to a European one.
education is free,
to the student. 221

A Socialist legal

i.e. the state provides it at no cost
As in civil law states, a legal

education in the Soviet Union is non-professional and
under exclusive control of the universities. 222

Thus it

emphasizes the theoretical over the practical, the
abstract over the concrete. 223
Substantive knowledge of codes of law and Socialist
ideology is the primary focus of legal study in Socialist
countries and very little emphasis, if any, is placed on
the development of skills of critical analysis. 224
Students are schooled in the philosophy underlying the
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law and are instructed in what the law is in particular
areas and how to correctly apply it.
One's success in a Socialist law school is
determined by one's proficiency for delivering oral
presentations; the ability to write well is given little
weight in the grading process. 225

The planned shortage of

lawyers in the former U.S.S.R. allows the state to
guarantee every law school graduate a job as a jurist. 226

Role of Judges:
Unlike their peers in the common law, judges in the
socialist legal tradition are not an elite group of
citizens. 227

They receive low salaries and for years the

Soviet Union did not require judges to have a legal
education, hence their professional status has not been
high. 2u

Traditionally, judges in socialist legal syst~ms

have been accountable to the Party and have been required
to uphold and advance its objectives. 229 Consequently,
judges in the socialist tradition have lacked the
independence, status, and prestige that judges in common
law sys terns enjoy . 230
It has been observed that "the judiciary is truly
66

the least dangerous branch of the Socialist government.

11231

With the exception of Poland, most of the Socialist
governments have modeled their judiciary after the Soviet
Union's. 232

In Communist China, Hungary, Mongolia, and

Cuba the primary role of judges is to apply predetermined
law to a given case. 233

Decisions are typically unanimous

and the name of the author is almost always unknown. 234

In

the event that a judge dissents from the decision of a
court and writes an opinion, it is common practice in
Socialist countries for the dissenting opinion to go
unpublished. 235
Although the courts are directly accountable to the
Party, it is the case that in some areas of law
legislators have given judges freedom, within established
parameters, to apply creativity. 236

This appears to be

more and more the case as legislatures have vested the
Courts with the power "to facilitate development" of the
Socialist person and

11

dispense justice" as it is

understood in Socialist terms. 237

Still, the overriding

position in Socialist states is that legislation
established by representative bodies should not be
delimited by

11

judge-made law". 238
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Socialist states have fostered the development of
Socialist law, historically the true source of law has
been the Party. 239
Vyshinsky states clearly the responsibility of the
Socialist jurist committed to the philosophy of MarxismLeninism:
[He] must expand his thinking beyond legal
relationships and legal norms. He must reject
this method in favor of dialectic materialism ..
he must ponder relations of state/society,
economic structure, production relationships ..
the jurist cannot separate the science of public
law from the science of economic development. 240

THE SOCIALIST PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Socialists' view of international law is
inseparable from their understanding of Western politics
in general.

International law is a tool employed by the

bourgeoisie to
toiling masses.

f~cilitate

their domination over the

E.B. Pashukanis summed up succinctly the

Socialist position on international law:

"modern

international law is the legal form of the struggle of
the capitalist states among themselves for domination
over the rest of the

world.

11

~1

James Hildebrand notes that the Soviets nonetheless
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admit that all states, including their own, use
international law as a weapon.

The only difference

between the Socialist states and the Western states is
that the former use international law to strengthen the
"democratic principles of law and peace in international
relations," while the latter uses it as a "means of
deceiving the peoples, of concealing imperialist designs
of expansion and aggression.

11242

Hildebrand offers an excellent analysis of the
relationship between Socialist law and international law.
He notes that the Socialist view of society creates a
dilemma for Soviets in the realm of international law.
He argues that Socialists, in an effort to be part of an
international community, have had to decide whether to
create an international legal system all their own or to
collaborate with the Western powers regardless of their
fundamentally irreconcilable socio-political outlooks. 243
According to Hildebrand, the history of Socialist legal
thought with regard to international law has involved a
series of attempts to reconcile traditional international
law with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 244
Hildebrand and others suggest that it was the
69

writings of one Soviet legal theorist in particular,
Grigori I. Tunkin, which brought the Socialists closer to
a reconciliation of international law and Marxism. 245

In

1956, Tunkin conceded that international law would have
to represent, to at least a certain extent, a compromise
between socialist and capitalist states desirous of a
body of rules applicable to all states.

If international

law were to embody only Socialist principles or only
capitalist principles then the states with differing
ideologies would be unable to agree on universal rules
for state behavior.

Despite these concessions, Tunkin

nonetheless remained firm on the notion of Soviet
supremacy in international law and credited his home
state with guiding the course of international law. 246
At roughly the same point in time that Tunkin was
contributing his ideas on Socialist legal theory, the
great Socialist states, China and the U.S.S.R., agreed to
adhere to five principles in their international legal
relations with capitalist states:
1.

the principle of the maintenance of mutual respect

for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other
70
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states;
2.

the mutual obligation not to attack other states;

3.

the mutual obligation of non-intervention in the

internal affairs of other states;
4. mutual equality and the granting of equal advantages;
5. peaceful coexistence. 247

In more recent years, cooperation has replaced
coexistence as the most important element in the
international legal relationship between the Soviets and
the Western states. 248

The

11

new thinking

11

that was

introduced into Soviet Society in the mid to late 1980's
in the form of Perestroika and Glasnost and which fueled
the break-up of the U.S.S.R. has helped to engender a
less antagonistic relationship, at least·legally
speaking, between the Soviets and the developed Western
states.

Still, one would expect differences to remain.
#

Surely, as long as the Socialist and capitalist states
have fundamental political disagreements, these will be
reflected in international law.

However, I would argue

that even if these political disagreements vanished
tomorrow,

the legacy of Socialist legal education and
71
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training would remain at the World Court for some time.
Although Hildebrand noticed as early as 1969 a
warming of the relationship between the Soviet Union and
the Western states, those Soviets in positions of power
in international law today were educated and trained
under a strongly Socialist state. 249

Even though dramatic

changes have occurred in the U.S.S.R. in the past decade
or so, those transformations do not erase the Socialist
past and in fact,
of instability.

those transformations remain in a state
So, the fact that the Soviets and the

Western states have warmed up to one another in the
international legal arena does not eradicate the
possibility that a Socialist legal education determines
the way in which a judge on the Court discovers and
applies international law.

Indeed, it might be the case

that it is precisely this Socialist legal education and
training that divides Socialist judges from their Western
counterparts in those cases that they disagree.

Since it

will take at the very least another twenty years until
the newest generation in the U.S.S.R. could become
influential in international law, it ought to be expected
that if Socialist legality were to fade out of the
72
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it would not be for many years

to come.
From the discussion of the Socialist legal system
above, one would expect to find substantive and
procedural divergences between Socialist judges at the
ICJ and their counterparts educated under other legal
traditions.

If Socialist thought structures Socialist

legality and is as all-encompassing as legal scholars
like Vyshinsky and Tunkin argued it was, then one would
expect the decisions of Socialist judges at the ICJ to
reflect elements of Socialist, or Marxist-Leninist
thought.

This is made even more true by the fact that

judges educated under a Socialist legal tradition were
taught to be a servant of the Socialist state and to
unquestioningly enforce its laws.

Of course the judges

at the World Court are not instructed to enforce or apply
Socialist law or to follow the dictates of a Communist
Party.

However, one would likely infer from the

teachings of the legal scholars noted above that the
Socialist judge is supposed to represent Socialist
principles at an international forum.

The judge's

commitment to Socialist ideals may have relaxed a bit
73
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with the transition from coexistence to cooperation, but
one would not want to suppose that cooperation on the
part of the Soviets means acceptance of capitalist
principles and practices.
One's expectations of finding elements of Marxist-

t

I

t

Leninist thought may contradict, however, the expectation
that Socialist judges will not deliver lengthy written
opinions or that they will not deliver separate opinions
at all.

The emphasis in Socialist legal education on

oral over written presentation makes an analysis of a
written decision by a Socialist judge potentially
problematic.

An examination of a

judgment for Marxist-

Leninist thought is not made easy by a short written
judgment or no opinion at all.
On the other hand, one should not be surprised to
find at the World Court a history of Socialist judges
dissenting without a written opinion since the opinion of
the judges in Socialist legal systems is not highly
valued.

Still, on the other hand, one might not be

surprised by a Socialist judge who never dissents since
dissenting opinions are highly discouraged in Socialist
legality.
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Since these expectations are clearly contradictory,
I would like to emphasize that the focus of this study is
international law, not domestic law.

With this and the

Socialist position on international law in mind, I would
think it more likely that Socialist judges at the World
Court would dissent from the judgment submitted by the
majority of justices than acquiesce simply because that
is what they were educated to do.
plays a

The Socialist judge

role at the World Court that is entirely

different than the role she or he would play in the
judiciary of her or his native state; the requirements of
the role of representing the Party are very different at
home than in international legal relations.

A judge

operating within the Socialist state upholds the law
created by the Party by behaving as a diligent servant of
the Party.

A Socialist judge at the World Court is not

dealing with law created by the Party and thus, to be a
diligent servant of the Party may have to dissent from
the majority who might represent Western powers.
One should not expect, however, that a dissenting
Socialist judge at the World Court will deliver an
opinion amounting to a lengthy treatise on Marxism75
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The legal tradition under which these

individuals have been bred taught them habits and methods
that should be reflected in their decision-making at the
World Court.

Further, with the cooperation that has been

witnessed in the international legal relations between
the Soviet Union and the West one would expect to see a
degree of ideological tolerance evolving between these
judges.
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CHAPTER THREE
The International Court of Justice

The ICJ has rendered decisions in over 76
international disputes since its inception in

1946. 2 ~

This project looks at three of these cases and analyzes
them with a view to discovering whether the legal
tradition under which a justice is educated and trained
for a career in the legal profession determines how she
or he finds and applies the law when adjudging an
international dispute at the World Court.

The

limitations of space and time preclude a full-scale
investigation into each and every decision made by the
Court throughout its entire history.

Instead, a

determination may be made through an examination of a
smaller set of cases chosen on the basis of clearly
defined criteria. 251
The three disputes selected for analysis were chosen
because they each satisfied certain criteria.

First,

each case was decided during a period of the ICJ's
activity that is distinguishable from the next.

Scott,

Bothwell, and Pennell examined the history of the Court's
activity and found, based on the political and legal
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developments since its inception, that the ICJ's history
could be logically divided into three eras:

ICJ I

(1946

through 1962), ICJ II (1963 through 1985), and ICJ III
( 1986 to present) . 252
Scott et al. argue that ICJ I can be understood as a
period of legal idealism. 253

With the recent memory of two

world wars firmly in their minds, state leaders turned to
international law for a peaceful settlement of their
disputes. 254

ICJ I represents one of the busiest

schedules in the Court's history; from 1946 to 1962
thirty one contentious cases and 12 advisory opinions
were submitted to the Court. 255
The period known as ICJ II marked a significant
decline in the number of cases submitted to the Court. 256
From 1963 to 1985, the Court received only 12 submissions
of contentious cases and 6 submissions for advisory
opinion. 257

Scott et al. further point out that several

of the judgments delivered by the Court during these
years were outrightly defied. 258

They explain this period

of inactivity at the Court as the result of the
intensification of cold war hostilities, including the
October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 259
78

--- -------- ----

Like ICJ I, ICJ III represents a period of upost-war
legal euphoria. " 260

As the Cold War has come to an end,

the ICJ is experiencing another round of high activity.
It appears that once again states are perceiving their
disputes as ones that would be best solved through the
application of legal rules and principles.
The cases I chose satisfied a second criterion:
division.

Divisive judgments appear to provide excellent

case studies for reaching conclusions about judicial
decision-making by individual justices at the World
Court.

Because they typically generate individual

opinions, both dissents and concurring opinions, they
also tend to provide further insight into the legal
reasoning of individual justices.

On the other hand,

cases with a majority judgment representing nearly every
justice on the Court tell us comparatively less about the
way each judge found and applied the law in a given case.
To be sure, a judgment supported by the entire court may
be indicative of a uniform method of finding and applying
the law in a

par~icular

case.

Nonetheless, the history

of the Court demonstrates that it has been split on more
occasions than it has been in full agreement, and thus
79

warrants an examination into potentially divergent
approaches to judicial decision at the World Court.
More importantly, however, divisive judgments
represent those cases that most likely diverge on lines
of legal tradition.

Because the judges come to the Court

with very different backgrounds and legal experience, a
one-sided judgment most likely indicates that legal
tradition did not determine how the justices found and
applied the law.

The cases I have chosen are widely

split with, in some cases, the majority of the Court
filing separate opinions, declarations or dissents in
opposition to the Court's judgment or the way in which it
arrived at the judgment.
I have also chosen to omit from the following
examination the decisions and votes of the ad hoc judges
in these cases.

Although the votes of these individuals

carry equal weight in the cases and are of ten accompanied
by individual opinions, research indicates that ad hoc
judges almost always vote in favor of the state that
appointed them. 261

In one study, Il Ro Suh found that

from 1922-1967 ad hoc judges voted with the government
that appointed them in 91% of the decisions. 262
80
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Hensley found,

in another study, that ad hoc judges

deviated from the other justices on the Court 44% of the
time, showing a marked voting preference for the
countries selecting them.

This evidence should not be

surprising, as ad hoc judges are appointed to the Court
for one case by a state who is a party to that case.

ICJ I:

The Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory, Judgment (12 April 1960) 263

Facts and Arguments:
On December 22, 1955 the state of Portugal filed an
application with the ICJ requesting that the Court uphold
a Portuguese right of passage through Indian territory. 264
Portugal maintained that its sovereignty over three
enclaves in the Indian Peninsula, Goa, Daman and Diu, was
violated in July, 1954 when Indian authorities prevented
Portugal from passing through Indian territory to the
enclaves. 265
In its application Portugal explained that prior to
July, 1954 the Indian and British practice was to allow
J

the Portuguese. to pass through Indian territory with the
purpose of exercising Portuguese rights of sovereignty
81
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over the enclaves. The Application alleged that since
1950 the situation had changed and that the Government of
India had denied a right of passage in July of 1954
pursuant with the

11

an open campaign

11

it was waging for

the annexation of Portuguese territories, specifically
the enclaves located within Indian territory. 266

It

further alleged that the Indian government had initiated
and supported a violent uprising on the enclaves that
begun prior to July of 1954 and that by denying Portugal
passage the Indian government was effectively preventing
the Portuguese government from putting a stop to the
violence. 267
Portugal insisted that India's refusal to allow
Portugal the right of passage in July of 1954 was in
violation of international law and part of a larger
effort on the part of India to expropriate the enclaves
that belonged to the state of Portugal.

Counsel for

Portugal cited the following sources of law as supportive
of the state's position:

1) The Treaty of Poona

concluded between Portugal and the Marathas in 1779
transferring sovereignty of the enclaves to Portugal; 2)
local custom and general custom; and 3) concordance of
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municipal legal systems with respect to access to
enclaved land. 268

Portugal further argued that state

practice and opinio juris supported its alleged right of
transit. 269
India invoked the reservations it had attached to
its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.of the Court.
In its fifth preliminary objection, the government of
India denied that the ICJ possessed jurisdiction over the
case, insisting that the dispute involved Indian
territory and thus fell under India's jurisdiction. 270

In

a sixth preliminary objection, it further opposed the
Court's jurisdiction, but on the grounds that the
situation began prior to February 5, 1930, the date set
by India in its acceptance of the Optional Clause
stipulating that no dispute arising earlier than it could
be adjudicated by the Court. 271
On the merits, India maintained that a right of
passage could not be recognized generally; states reserve
the right to limit the right of passage if the situation
calls for it.

A right of passage is both indeterminate

and indeterminable - it finds no basis in principles of
international law or in custom, local or general. 272
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Counsel for India further argued that the treaty Portugal
relied on for its case was not a treaty at all but rather
a set of negotiations that never resulted in an
agreement. 273

India held that there was never any official

transfer of sovereignty of the enclaves in question to
the state of Portugal; if the Portuguese usurped
sovereignty of the enclaves, the Indians reasoned, the
right of passage surely did not come with this title of
sovereignty. 274

India also pointed to governmental acts of

both Great Britain and India between 1818 and 1954 as
proof of a denial on their part of a Portuguese right of
passage. 275
Finally, in defense of its denial of passage to
Portugal on July 1954, India described the violent
uprising in the enclaves as a liberation movement by
Asians who desired to join the Union of Independent
India.n6

India denied the accusation that it was

assisting the overthrow of Portuguese power in the
enclaves and argued that at the time of the request for
and subsequent denial of passage to Portugal, any
Portuguese presence in the enclaves would have escalated
the violent conflict.m
84
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Judgment:
The issue at the heart of the Right of Passage case
is one that concerns all states:
sovereignty.

territorial

The Court in the Right of Passage Case was

charged with determining the limits and/or extent of
state sovereignty with regard to a right of passage.

A

right of passage threatens a state which must cede it to
other states because it represents a limitation to the
authority that that state may assert over territory its
government rightfully claims as its own.
The overriding issue of sovereignty is evidenced in
the questions upon which the Court voted.

The following

is a breakdown of those votes:

1)

I

13 to 2 - The Court rejected India's fifth

preliminary objection wherein the Indian government
argued that the question of the grant or refusal of the
passage claimed over Indian territory by Portugal fell
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of India and
outside the jurisdiction of the Court;
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2) 11 to 4 - The Court rejected India s sixth preliminary
1

objection wherein the Indian government argued that the
dispute arose before 5 February 1930;

3) 11 to 4

- The Court found that Portugal did have in

Indian territory between the enclaves of Dadra and NagarAveli and the coastal 1954 a right of passage over
intervening district of Daman and between those
enclaves, to the extent necessary for the exercise of
Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves and subject to
the regulation and control of India, in respect of
private persons, civil officials and goods in
general;

4) 8 to 7 -

It found that Portugal did not have in 1954

such a right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed
police, and arms and ammunition;

5) 9 to 6 -

The Court found that India had not failed in

1954 to fulfill its obligation in regard to that right of
passage; 278
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Majority = M
Dissent = D
Separate Opinion =

so

JUDGES-TRADITION
Klaestad - civil
Zaf. Khan - common
Basdevant - civil
Hackworth - common
Winiarski - civ/soc
Badawi - civil
Spender - common
Armond-Ugon - civil
Kojevnikov - social
Quintana - civil
Cordova - civil
Koo - common
Spiropoulos - civil
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By a vote of 13 to 2 the Court rejected India's fifth
preliminary objection.

The Court observed that Portugal

had invoked international law to support its position and
it agreed with the Portuguese that the dispute was on an
international plane. 279

It also struck down India's sixth

preliminary objection which precluded a state from
bringing to the Court a dispute which originated prior to
5 February 1930.

The Court found the law relevant to

this objection in the PCIJ's decision in the case of the
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria. 280

In that case

the Court ruled that the prior situation or facts of a
dispute which are to be considered in adjudicating that
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dispute are only those which are the source of the
dispute not the source of the right in question in the
dispute . 281
On the merits, the Court upheld India's argument
that the Treaty of Poona did not grant sovereignty of the
enclaves to Portugal and that rather what was established
was a revenue tenure. 282

By granting permission of transit

to the Portuguese to collect revenue in the villages the
Indian and British governments had not established a
Portuguese right of passage.
On the matter of customary international law,
however, the Court did accept Portugal's argument that
because the British and Indian governments never objected
to the Portuguese representing themselves as sovereign of
the enclaves, those governments tacitly recognized
Portugal as sovereign over the village.

According to the

Court, past practice demonstrated that the passage by the
Portuguese of private persons, civil officials, and goods
into the enclaves went unhindered, with the exception of
blockages during World War II. 283

The Court observed that

for one and one quarter century, the constant and uniform
practice of allowing free passage between Daman and the
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enclaves for transporting private persons, civil
officials and goods endured and thus developed into a law
between the Parties with the establishment of a right for
Portugal and a correlative obligation for India. 284
The situation was different, however, for passage of
armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition.

The

Court found no evidence supporting Portugal's claim that
all transit was exercised or permitted and in fact it
cited evidence that demonstrated that previous
authorization was required to send armed forces, etc.
through British and then Indian territory. 285

In short,

the Court found a right of transit and a correlative
obligation with regard to the passage of civil and
private persons and goods but neither a right nor an
obligation pertaining to the passage of armed forces,
armed police, arms, and ammunition.

Composition of the Court: 286
Helge Klaestad (Norway): Judge Klaestad earned his Doctor
Juris at the University in Oslo, a civil law institution.
Shortly thereafter he embarked on a career in
international arbitration.

He presided over the AngloI

German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in London and in the
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following year he became the Sole Arbitrator of a number
of bilateral treaties.

After many more similar

appointments, Judge Klaestad was finally appointed to the
Supreme Court of Norway in 1931 and fifteen years later
he became a justice at the ICJ.

Judge Klaestad served on

the ICJ from 1946 to 1961.

Muhammad Zafrulla Khan,

(Pakistan):

Judge'Zafrulla Khan

was educated under the common law tradition as he
received his Bachelor of Arts from Punjab University and
a Bachelor of Laws from King's College in London.

He has

held many prestigious appointments including President of
the General Assembly of the United Nations, member of the
Supreme Court of India and first Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the newly created Republic of Pakistan.

Judge

Zafrulla Khan served on the ICJ from 1954 to 1961 and
again from 1964 to 1973.

Jules Basdevant,

(France):

Judge Basdevant earned his

Doctor of Law in Legal, Political and Economic Sciences
in a civil law institution on the European continent.

He

was a professor of law at Rennes, Grenoble and Paris and
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at the Naval Staff College, the Centre of Higher Naval
Studies, and at the Academy of International Law at The
Hague.

Judge Basdevant was a member of the French

delegation at many international conferences, an agent of
the French government in many international arbitrations,
and legal advisor to the French Foreign Ministry.

He

served on the ICJ from 1946 to 1964.

Green H. Hackworth,

(U.S.A.): Educated at Valparaiso,

Georgetown University, George Washington University and
the University of Kentucky, Judge Hackworth was a student
of the common law tradition.

For twenty years he worked

in the State Department serving as an attorney, a
solicitor, and as legal advisor to the Secretary of
State.

He sat on the Supreme Court of the District of

Columbia and represented the United States at numerous
international legal conferences.

Judge Hackworth served

on the ICJ from 1946 to 1961.

Bohdan Stefan Winiarski,

(Poland):

Judge Winiarski was

educated in the law at Warsaw, Cracow, Heidelberg and
Paris, all civil law universities at the time of his
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Early on in his tenure at the ICJ, however,

the October revolution brought Socialist thought to the
Soviet Union and to its Eastern European satellites,
including Poland.

His teaching position in Cracow was

interrupted in 1917 when he was enlisted in the Russian
Army.

He eventually returned to teach law in Poland

serve as a diplomat for his country.

and

Judge Winiarski

served on the ICJ from 1946 to 1967.

Abdal-Hamid Badawi,

Judge Badawi received his

(Egypt):

Doctor of Law from the University of Grenoble, a civil
law institution.

In Egypt he was a Professor of law , a

Director in the Ministry of Justice, and Legal Adviser to
the government.

He also served as Minister of Finance,

Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Senator.

Like many of

his counterparts on the ICJ, he was a delegate for his
country at many international conferences.

Judge Badawi

served on the ICJ from 1946 to 1965.

Sir Percy Spender,

(Australia): Judge Spender received a

common law legal education at Sydney University in
Australia.

His interests led him to a career in public
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service in both domestic and international roles.

He was

a member of the House of Representatives, Treasurer,
Minister for External Affairs, and Ambassador to the
United States.

He led many Australian delegations to

international conferences and was Vice-President of the
5th General Assembly of the U.N.

Judge Spender served on

the ICJ from 1958 to 1967.

Enrique C. Armand-Ogon,

(Uruguay):

Although no clear

information exists, it appears that Judge Armand-Ugon
received his Doctor in Law and Social Sciences in
Uruguay, a civil law state.

There he worked as a

Provincial Attorney, a Judge of the Court of First
Instance, a Judge in the Court of

App~al,

a Judge in the

High Court, and he finally served as President of the
High Court.

Like his counterparts on the World Court, he

was represented his country at many international
conferences.

Judge Armand-Ugon served on the ICJ from

1952 to 1961.

Feodor Ivanovich Kojevnikov,

(O.S.S.R.): Judge Kojevnikov

studied socialist law at Moscow University in the 1920's.
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He became a professor upon graduation and twice served as
Dean of his Faculty.

Kojevnikov held several

appointments with the Soviet government including
President of the Legal Section of the Society for
Cultural Relations of the USSR with Foreign Countries and
Member of the Committee of Experts in Legal Science at
the Ministry of Culture of the USSR.

Judge Kojevnikov

served on the ICJ from 1953 to 1961.

(Argentina): Judge Moreno

Lucio Manuel Moreno Quintana,

Quintana earned a Doctor of Law at Buenos Aires, a civil
law institution, in 1920.

For most of his life he worked

as a university professor in Buenos Aires however his
success took him to lectures all over the world.

He held

the directorship of the International Law Institute in
Buenos Aires and in addition to teaching, held public
offices.

Judge Moreno Quintana served on the ICJ from

1955 to 1964.

Roberto Cordova,

(Mexico):

Judge Cordova also studied

law under the civil law tradition, at the National
University of Mexico.

Throughout most of his career
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prior to becoming a judge at the ICJ he served as a
diplomat for Mexico.

He was a delegate to numerous

international conferences and was appointed Legal Advisor
to the Mexican Foreign Service.

Judge Cordova served on

the ICJ from 1955 to 1964.

V.K. Wellington Koo,

Judge Wellington Koo was

(China):

educated in the common law in America at Columbia
University.

He became a government official upon his

return to China and from 1915 to 1920 he served as
Minister to Mexico, Cuba and the USA.

He represented

China at the League of Nations and from 1926-1927 was
both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of China.
Judge Wellington Koo served on the ICJ from 1957 to 1967.

Jean Spiropoulos, (Greece):

Judge Spiropoulos was

educated in the civil law on the European continent and
earned his Doctor of Law in Leipzig in 1922.

In Greece

he became a Professor of International Law at Salonika
and Director of the Legal Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

He then

turn~d

to the international

sphere where he held, among other positions, the
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chairmanship of the International Law Commission.

He was

a delegate for Greece at several international
conferences and served as judge ad hoc in the Ambatielos
case.

Judge Spiropoulos served on the ICJ from 1958-

1967.

Analysis:
From the distribution of votes presented in the
table above, one is led to conclude that, at least in the
case of the justices who comprised the majority and were
educated under either a common law or civil law system,
legal tradition was not a variable in the judicial
decision-making process.

An analysis of the decision

confirms this observation.
In its effort to find the law, the Court concerned
itself primarily with the practice that had evolved
between the two states.

Indeed it explicitly found the

law governing this dispute in one and one quarter
century's worth of state practice between Portugal, on
the one hand, and India and Great Britain on the other.
The law applicable to this matter was a product of the
interactions of these particular states:
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The Court is here dealing with a concrete case
having special features.
Historically the c~se
goes back to a period when, and relates to a
region in which, the relations between neighbouring States were not regulated by precisely
formulated rules but were governed largely by
practice. Where therefore the Court finds a
practice clearly established between the two
States which was accepted by the Parties as
governing the relations between them, the Court
must attribute decisive effect to that
practice for the purpose of determining their
specific rights and obligations. Such a
particular practice must prevail over any
general rules. 287

Taking into consideration that state practice and
opinio juris are fundamental sources of customary
international law, the judgment may not be surprising. 288
Nonetheless, the Court's emphasis on the history of the
relations of the two states, i.e. the facts, and the
understandings the governments had about these relations,
is reflective of the common law style of reasoning.

One

sees in an examination of the decision that the Court
spent little time dwelling on the principle of
territorial sovereignty at issue in the case and in fact
searched for the limits and/or extent of sovereignty
through its examination of the facts and of the
understandings each state displayed about Portugal's
passage through Indian territory.
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This common law style of reasoning is countered by
the Court's application of the law which is more
representative of a civil law approach to adjudication.
The justices who comprised the majority limited their
function to an application of the law found through a
knowledge of the facts.

They did not set out to create

law or impose judge-made law on Portugal and India.
Instead, they applied the law that they perceived to have
been created by the two states in conflict over the
course of history.
Thus the Court's method of finding and applying the
law was not representative of one legal tradition nor was
the judgment a product of only or mostly civil law judges
or only or mostly common law judges; the judgment
embodied methods of judicia1 reasoning and decision that
could be traced back to both the common and civil law
traditions.
Thus we may want to interpret the decision of the Court
in The Right of Passage Case as more reflective of
international law and the rules it establishes for the
justices than of a particular type of legal tradition
that dominated the Court at that time.
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international law, a primary source of international law,
is the law governing this dispute, then an examination of
the facts is the requisite method for discovering the
law.

If it is customary international law that is being

determined, the Court would want to determine what the
state practice relevant to the dispute was between the
two states and whether or not the additional component of
opinio juris had been developed.

Further, if the Court

perceived its function in the same way as states
perceived it, then it would assist the states in
determining what law they had created rather than
creating law itself.
The dissenting opinions do, however, raise the
possibility that legal tradition may have been a variable
in at least one decision.

Like the majority, the

dissenters are an eclectic group.

Aside from the two ad

hoc judges, they are composed of three civil law judges,
one common law judge, one judge educated in the common
law and Asian law, one Socialist judge, and one judge
educated in the civil law and practiced in Socialist law.
Justice Moreno Quintana, a civil law judge, began
his process of legal reasoning with an explication of the
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principle of state territorial sovereignty which he
viewed as placing a burden on Portugal to prove why India
had an obligation to honor a right a passage.•

He

averred that a right of passage is neither varying nor
inexact;
not.

11290

11

~he

right either exists in law or it does

He further refused to consider the claim of

sovereignty based on practice as he saw that the Court
had done in its judgment.

Before turning to an analysis

of the facts, Moreno Quintana explained how he would
judge their significance in the dispute:
In the international sphere the normal method of
acquiring rights or of contracting obligations
takes the form of an agreement, which in its
widest sense is termed a treaty ... In any case,
I consider that the validity of a general
principle may take the place of international
custom, and the existence of international
custom the place of a treaty.mi

It appears, from this brief analysis, that Moreno
Quintana's entire judgment hinged on what he believed
should have been done in principle as he concludes it
with a statement about how the Court's support of the
Portuguese claims to sovereignty over the islands equates
to support of the survival of the colonial system.

To

uphold Portugal's claim to a right of passage with regard
100
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to civilians and goods is to "fly in the face of the
United Nations Charter.

11292

He warned the Court that it,

as the judge of its own law and the judge of its own age,
"cannot turn its back upon the world as it is.
International law must adapt itself to political
necessities. " 293
Moreno Quintana appears to be searching for an
answer to the fundamental question underlying the civil
law tradition:

"What is just?"

His single-minded

concern with principle is representative of the reasoning
taught to students of the civil law.

However, if his

method for discovering the law looks more reflective of
the civil law tradition, then his admonition to the Court
betrays a common law perception of the judge as a
powerful individual with the authority and duty to create
law as she or he sees fit.

He implores the Court to take

a stand against imperialism through its judicial
capacity, in essence asking the Court to make a political
statement rather than a legal one.

He is, in this sense,

the quintessential common law judge exercising the power
to make grand statements about the morality of the law.
These observations notwithstanding, the substance of
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Moreno Quintana's concerns can lead one to a different
conclusion about why he discovered and applied the law
the way that he did.

Recall that Moreno Quintana is a

judge from Latin America, specifically Argentina.

With

this in mind, his decision may look more like a political
statement than a legal one.

It is no secret that many

Latin American governments and those of other relatively
less developed states have been and continue to be
dissatisfied with what they perceive to be a domination
of global resources by more developed and consequently,
more powerful states. 294

These governments often criticize

the institution of colonization of smaller, less
developed regions by larger, more powerful states as
exploitative relationships designed to keep the power
imbalance in place. 295

Thus, Moreno Quintana's admonition

could have been, and in light of the observations made
about the influence of legal tradition on the majority
and on Moreno Quintana, may have more likely been
politically motivated.

If Moreno Quintana's discovery

and application of the law exemplifies elements of both
the common law and civil law traditions, and perhaps too
the Socialist law tradition with its disdain for Western
102
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imperialism, then it seems that the probability that the
legal tradition under which he was educated and worked
most of his life, the civil law, is slim.

This being the
.

case, it would seem that the alternative explanation,
based on political convictions, is the more powerful one.
This finding

furt~er

strengthens the conclusion made

about the judgment.
Armand-Ugon and Badawi were the only other
dissenters whose methods for discovering and applying the
law may be attributable to a civil law education.

Badawi

expressed concern over the difficulty of reconciling
recognition of sovereignty with the exercise of a
discretion which, in principle, repudiates one essential
consequence of that sovereignty. 296

Still, he indicated

that the answer to this question could only be found
through a thorough analysis of the facts.

He did,

·1

however, mention that the confusion surrounding some of
the facts may have obscured the "true legal aspect" of
the relations between Portugal and Great Britain, and
then India - an indication that truth is somewhere
lurking behind the confusion of the facts. 297
Armand-Ugon also demonstrated a slight interest in
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right 11 answer; he expressed concern with the

right of territorial sovereignty and the demands that it
made upon the states and the Court.

Before presenting

his argument, Armand-Ugon advised his fellow judges:
Our reasoning must proceed on the basis of the
validity of the argument in favour of full
sovereignty and of that in favour of a saranjam ... It would be inadmissible to grant sovereignty over certain territories or a saranjam
of certain villages and then to set up
obstacles to the fulfillment of the obligations
agreed upon . 298

Both Armand-Ugon and Badawi then reasoned, albeit to
varying degrees, with a governing principle in mind.
The rest of the justices who dissented from at least
one question on the merits concentrated exclusively on
the facts of the case and on what law could be found in
the history of the dispute.

Judge Spender, who disagreed

with the Court's distinction between the passage of armed
forces, etc. and civilian goods and persons and its
conclusion that India had not acted contrary to its
obligation, appears to have placed concerns of principle
in his argument as a second premise.

He began his

argument with an analysis of the meaning of the Treaty of
Poona and proceeded to examine the historical record on
104
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Portuguese passage to the enclaves, citing dates and
British and Indian responses to requests for passage. 299
Only after the discussion of facts did Spender touch upon
some of the principles governing the dispute.

He stated

that "a necessity to apply for a license before an act is
done is not necessarily incompatible with a right to do
that

act.

11

~0

He further asserted that "discretion in

refusing and granting permission is not absolute - it is
controllable and must be exercised in good faith.

11301

This type of argument is also on display in
Wellington Koo's separate opinion.

Like Spender, he

objected to that part of the Court's decision that takes
armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition out
of the scope of the right of passage. 302

And again, like

Spender, Wellington Koo paid close attention to the facts
of the case, including documents such as agreements,
notes, and treaties.

He cited dates and recorded the

responses of Britain and India to Portuguese requests for
transit to the enclaves.
Again, only after he established the factual
situation and found that there developed a practice of
allowing all types of goods and persons to pass to the
105

enclaves did Wellington Koo make recourse to principles
of international law or ideas about state behavior. 303
Once he established that India behaved in ways indicating
that it considered Portugal the sovereign over the
enclaves, Wellington Koo commented that the fact that an
enclaved land has been able to enjoy passage through the
surrounding land of another state is

11

based upon.reason

and the elementary principle of justice.

11304

Another disagreement on the Court that cannot go
unmentioned, one between Kojevnikov and Winiarski, hints
to a split along lines of legal tradition.

Judge

Kojevnikov's brief and unexplained refusal to accept
jurisdiction contrasts with Judge Winiarski's joint
dissent with Badawi wherein, based on an analysis of the
facts and arguments of the parties, they reject the
Court's position on the sixth preliminary objection and
find the origin of the dispute at an earlier date.
This prima facie divergence, however, might not be a
split at all as Winiarski's education was considerably
more eclectic than that of the Soviet judge.

Recall that

Winiarski studied in Paris and Heidelberg in addition to
Cracow and Warsaw and that Socialism had not been
106

introduced into Poland until after his education.

So

although Winiarski identified himself as a Socialist, his
civil law education combined with what may be a civil law
tendency to perceive of his judicial function as more
participatory (when compared to the Soviet perception)
may have made a strong imprint on his judicial role in
this case.
Kojevnikov, on the other hand, studied law in Moscow
immediately after the introduction of Socialism.

This

was also the era of "legal nihilism" when law schools and
the legal profession were downplaying the importance of
law including the role of the judge.

One might be able

to explain Kojevnikov's brief declaration as indicative
of his Socialist legal education which did not place high
value on the practice of writing as it did on oral
presentation.

Kojevnikov's brief and terse declaration

corresponds with the expectation that Socialist judges at
the World Court would continue to display some of the
habits they learned as students of Socialist law.

The

fact that he dissented does not contradict the
expectations stated in Chapter Two as it was noted that
the role of the Socialist judge on the World Court is
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dramatically different than her or his role in the
Socialist state and as such one would expect to see
dissenting opinions delivered by Socialist judges.
It was also noted in Chapter Two that a short
opinion might obscure any evidence of ideological
predispositions in the opinion of a Socialist judge.
Kojevnikov supported India's preliminary objections and
objected to the Court's reasoning on the grounds that
Portugal did not in 1954 or at any point prior to that
time have sovereignty over the enclaves.

These

statements are brief and make no reference to a Socialist
ideology, thus any conclusions drawn from this opinion
regarding his Marxist-Leninist-mentality would be highly
speculative.

However, one might consider that the

socialist legal tradition is resentful of what socialists
perceive as Western imperialism and it places a high
value on state sovereignty.
Finally, Spiropoulos submitted a declaration
testifying to his agreement with Spender, Armand-Ugon,
and Wellington Koo on the submissions of Portugal on the
merits.

Perhaps Spiropoulos's agreement with what appear

to be two different types of arguments symbolizes what
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one would want to conclude from the observations above.
It appears in this case that even if civil law or common
law methods of discovering and applying the law can be
found in the dissenting opinions of a few justices,
specifically Badawi, Armand-Ugon, Kojevnikov, and
Winiarski, most of the justices appear to be deciding
cases according to some other approach.

Spender and

Wellington Koo, although they seemed to have
predominantly applied common law methods of reasoning,
appear to have discovered and applied the law in a way
similar to the majority, combining common law and civil
law techniques.

The only disagreement between the

opinions of those two, Spender and Wellington Koo, and
the majority was their interpretation of the facts.
There is evidence which indicates that the civil law
dissenters may have employed methods of discovering and
applying the law traceable to their. legal education, but
the majority and the common law dissenters appear to be
adhering to the rules of international law which have
created for the justices a particular role with
identifiable constraints.

Also, it is more likely that

Moreno Quintana was motivated in his decision by
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political convictions rather than legal concerns.
Finally, it seems reasonable to suppose that the source
of disagreement between Kojevnikov and Winiarski might be
attributable to their distinct legal educations since
both justices represented Socialist states.
The general conclusion that one must draw from the
analysis of the Right of Passage Case, then, is that
legal tradition appears not to have been a variable in
the decision-making process of most of the judges but may
have determined, albeit to what degree is unknown,

the

way in which three or four of the dissenters, civil law
and socialist judges, discovered and applied the law.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ICJ I I :

THE NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES, JUDGMENT
(20 February 1969) 305

Facts and Arguments:
Prior to submitting their dispute to the ICJ,
Germany, The Netherlands and Denmark had attempted to
resolve a disagreement over the delimitations of the
continental shelf in the North Sea.

The Netherlands and

Denmark insisted that the delimitation was governed by a
mandatory rule of law which, reflecting the language of
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf, was designated as the
circumstances rule.

11

equidistance-special

11306

The effect of this rule is that in the absence of
agreement by the Parties to employ another method, all
continental shelf boundaries must be drawn by means of an
equidistance line, unless or except to the extent to
which

11

special circumstances 11 are recognized to exist.

Denmark and The Netherlands stressed that this rule was
binding on Germany independently of any specific assent,
111
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direct or indirect. 307
The two countries advanced an additional, and more
abstract argument. They argued that the positive law
supportive of their position could be augmented by the
natural law governing delimitation of continental
shelves.
The supremacy of the equidistance-special circumstance
rule could be found,

in addition to written agreements,

through the exercise of reason; it was an a priori and
necessary rule of delimitation to be applied towards a
resolution of this

dispute.~ 8

Germany continually objected to the resolution
proposed by the other two countries.

Instead, it invoked

the "just and equitable share" principle which allocates
to the state an amount of the continental shelf in
proportion to the length of its coastline or sea
frontage. 309

Germany additionally argued that the nature

of the shelf created a situation whereby all of the
countries were entitled to a piece of the central
portion. 310
In a joint agreement to submit their dispute to the
ICJ, the parties asked the Court to answer the following
112

question:

"What principles and rules of international

law are applicable to the delimitations as between the
parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the
North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the
partial boundary determined by the above-mentioned
Convention of 1 December 1964? 11311

Judgment:

By a vote to 11 to 6 the Court found
a)
the use of the equidistance method for delimitation
not being obligatory on Pa~ties;
b)
there being no other single method of delimitation
the use of which is in all circumstances obligatory;
c) the principles and rule$ to be applied to this
particular delimitation are as follows:
1. delimitation is to be effected by agreement in
accordance with equitable principles, and taking account
of all the relevant circumstances,
in such a way as to
leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts
of the continental shelf that constitute a natural
prolongation of its land territory into and under the
sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of
the land territory of the other;
2.
any overlappings are to be divided between them in
agreed proportions.
d) in the course of the negotiations, the factors to be
taken into account are to include:
1. the general configurations of the coasts of the
113
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Parties, as well as the presence of any special or
unusual features;
2. the physical and geological structures of the areas
involved.
3. the element of a reasonable degree of
proportionality. 3 u

Majority = M
Dissent = D
Separate Opinion

= so

JUDGES-TRADITION
Rivero - civil
Koretsky - social
Fitzmaurice - comm
Tanaka - comm/civ
Morelli - civil
Zaf. Khan - common
Lachs - civ/com/soc
P. Nervo - civ/com
Forster - civil
Gros - civil
Ammoun - civil
Bengzon - civil
Petren - civil
Onyeama - common
Jessup - common

VOTE

so
D
M
D
D
M

D

so
M
M

so
D
M
M

so

The majority of the Court dismissed Germany's
request for a delimitation of the North Sea continental
shelf on the basis of the just and equitable share
principle. "Delimitation of a continental shelf," the
judgment read,

11

must be equitably effected, however, it
114

cannot have as its object the awarding of an equitable
share.

11313

Characterizing the just and equitable share

doctrine as

11

wholly at variance with the most fundamental

of all the rules of law relating to the continental
shelf,

11

the Court proceeded to answer Denmark and the

Netherlands contention: Does the equidistance-special
circumstance principle constitute a mandatory rule, on
either a conventional basis or according to customary
international law? 314
The Court quickly struck down the two states'
argument based on natural law stating that with regard to
the relations of states, no obligation is known prior to
practice. 315

It then turned to the positive law presented

by the states.

After reviewing treaty history,

discussions of the International Law Commission,
committees of experts on delimitation, and international
conferences regarding continental shelf delimitation, the
Court concluded that the principle of equidistance had at
no time been regarded as an inherent necessity of
continental shelf doctrine. 316
The majority further disagreed with Denmark and the
Netherlands on their contention that the principle of
115

equidistance had developed into a rule of customary
international law as a result of its incorporation into
the Geneva convention. 317

The Court agreed that such

development can occur but observed that in the case of
the equidistance principle, no such
place.

11

hardening

11

had taken

The Court pointed out moreover that the Geneva

Convention had not received a sufficient number of
ratifications and accessions to characterize it as normcreating for all states nor had it been in force long
enough for what was a principle at its drafting to have
developed into a rule of law at the time of the dispute. 318

Composition of the court319 :

Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero,

(Peru): At the civil law

universities of Arequipa and Cuczo, Judge Bustamente y
Rivero studied law and politics, philosophy, history and
letters.

Before entering a career in political office

which included such positions as Ambassador to Uruguay
and Minister to Bolivia, Bustamente y Rivero was a
practicing attorney and served in the Peruvian judiciary.
He was a member of the ICJ from 1961-1970.
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Vladimir M. Koretsky,

(U.S.S.R.): Judge Koretsky's legal

career began with a Socialist legal education at the
Universities of Moscow and Kharkov.

From 1920-1949 he

held a chair at Kharkov and was a member of a number of
law societies.

In the 1940's and 1950's Judge Koretsky

represented his country on international committees.
He served as a judge on the ICJ from 1961-1970.

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,

(Great Britain): Judge

Fitzmaurice earned a common law legal education at
Gonville and Caius College in Cambridge.

After

practicing as a private attorney, Fitzmaurice became
legal adviser for his country.
numerous

intern~tional

He represented Britain at

conferences.

He was a member of

the ICJ from 1960-1973.

Kotaro Tanaka,

(Japan): Like other Asian scholars, Judge

Tanaka was educated in.the law in a number of countries
and thus, in a number of traditions.

He earned his law

degree from Tokyo Imperial University and subsequently
~

traveled to the common law USA and civil law Europe to do
117

post-graduate work in commercial law.

In Japan Tanaka

became a prolific writer and served as a tutor for the
Crown Prince and Princess, member of the House of Peers,
Minister of Education, and Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.

Philip

He was a justice at the ICJ from 1961-1970.

c.

Jessup,

(U.S.A.): Judge Jessup earned an LL.D

from Hamilton College, a Ph.D. from Columbia University,
and LL.B. from Yale University, all common law
institutions.

He was a member of a law firm throughout

much of his legal career and concurrently taught at
Columbia and served as Assistant Solicitor at the State
Department.

Jessup represented the U.S. at -many

international congresses.

He served as a judge at the

ICJ from 1961-1970.

Gaetano Morelli,

(Italy): Judge Morelli earned his Doctor

of Law in Rome, a civil law country, and for the next
forty years taught at universities across Italy.

He also

performed diplomatic functions for his native country and
was a member of many legal societies.
the ICJ from 1961-1970.
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Muhammad Zafrulla Khan,
Study

f
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(Pakistan): Discussed in previous

p • 90 •

Manfred Lachs,

(Poland): Before entering the London

School of Economics, Judge Lachs studied law in Vienna
and Nancy at civil law institutions.

He remained in

England throughout World War II and began his
international legal career there.

Once back in Poland

Judge Lachs became an international representative for
his country.

He served on the ICJ from 1967-1993.

Luis Padilla Nervo,

(Mexico): Although he earned one law

degree from the University of Mexico, a civil law
institution, Judge Padilla Nervo earned a second at
George Washington University, a common law institution.
He also studied law in Buenos Aires and the London School
of Economics before embarking on a career as a Mexican
ambassador and public official.

He was a member of the

ICJ from 1964-1973.

Isaac Forster,

(Senegal): Judge Forster graduated from
119

the Lycee Hoche in Versailles and received a law degree
from the Paris Law faculty, a civil law institution.
Most of his career was spent in the Senegalese judiciary;
however he also served as a representative for his
country at many international conventions and
commissions.

Andre Gros,

He was a justice at the ICJ from 1964-1982.

(France):

Judge Gros earned a civil law

education at Lyons and Paris Universities.

He

subsequently entered a career in academia, lecturing
across France, in Argentina, and at The Hague.

From

1947-1963, he held a position in the Legal Department of
the Foreign Ministry and throughout those years
represented France at numerous international conferences.
He was a member of the ICJ from 1964-1984.

Fouad Ammoun,

(Lebanon): After earning a Bachelor of Law

at Beirut School of Law, Judge Ammoun traveled to Lyon,
where he earned his Doctor of Law under the civil law
tradition.

He occupied many positions in the Lebanese

government and judiciary serving as legal adviser,
ambassador, Secretary-General, and Chairman of.several
120
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national, regional, and international committees. He was
a justice at the ICJ from 1965-1976.

Cesar Bengzon,

(Philippines): Judge Bengzon earned a

Bachelor of Laws at the University of the Philippines in
1919.

He immediately went to work for the Bureau of

Justice and eventually became Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.

In addition to teaching law at the

Philippine universities, Judge Bengzon performed
diplomatic functions for his government.

He was a member

of the ICJ from 1967-1976.

Sture Petren, {Sweden): As a student at Lund University,
Judge Petren earned a civil law degree and a degree in
the Humanities.

The many positions he filled in

government include but are not limited to Associate Judge
at the Court of Appeals, Director of Legal Department at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador, legal
adviser, Professor , and member of International
commissions. He served on the ICJ from 1967-1976.

Charles D. Onyeama,

(Nigeria):
121

Judge Onyeama's education

began in Nigeria where he attended several schools of
government.

He earned his LL.B. at London University and

studied law at Brasenose College in Oxford, both common
law institutions. After serving for the Nigerian
legislature, Judge Onyeama began a career in the
judiciary where he eventually became Chief Justice of the
Nigerian Supreme Court.

He was a member of the ICJ from

1967-1976.

Analysis:
Again, it appears from the votes that the majority of
the Court did not discover and apply the law in a way
reflective of their respective legal traditions.

The

analysis of the judgment supports this observation.

Of

the justices who composed the Court's decision in the
North Sea Cases, three were educated under the common
law, three were educated in the civil law and one, Judge
Padillo Nervo, was educated in both the civil law and
common law traditions.

One common law judge, Jessup, and

two civil law judges, Bustamante y Rivero and Ammoun,
delivered separate opinions.
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The civil law and common law justices representing
the majority in this case reasoned the legal dispute and
employed a method of finding the law similar to the Court
in the Right of Passage Case.

Here, as in the earlier

case, the Court's judgment hinged on state practice and
other observable factors.

In fact the Court quickly

struck down the natural law argument proposed by Denmark
and the Netherlands by insisting that there existed no
legal obligation, known prior to state practice, to use
the equidistance method of delimitation.
The Court proceeded to review the positive law on
delimitation in order to find the law applicable to the
particular dispute.

From an examination of the Truman

Proclamation, records of the ILC, the conclusions of
committees of experts on delimitation of continental
shelves, conferences on delimitation and the history of
state practice with regard to delimitation, the Court
found two rules of law that have historically governed
delimitation.

It then instructed the Parties to adhere

to these particular rules when delimiting the shelf in
the North Sea.
The point of contention that occupied much of the
123
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Court's time concerned the legal status of Article 6 in
the Geneva Convention which, Denmark and The Netherlands
argued, advanced the status of the equidistance method
from a legal principle to a rule of international law.
The Court's disagreement with this claim rested wholly on
its observation of state practice or more accurately, the
lack thereof, with regard to delimitation based on the
equidistance principle.

More importantly, it refused to

find customary law in a treaty that, in its opinion, had
few accessions and ratifications.

The Court chose not to

find international law in a document that, in its
analysis, was not binding on all states.

Thus on the

matter of the Geneva Convention, the Court put the lawmaking authority back into the hands of the states which,
through their interactions, could advance a nonobligatory principle of law to an obligatory rule of law.
Although this self-imposed limitation suggests a
civil law-like approach to the application of law, one
can find little or no evidence in this judgment of a
traditional civil law approach to finding the law.
is no discussion or any hints of concern about what
justice requires or what the "correct" answer to the
124
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dispute might be.

Moreover, the Court not only bases its

decision on concrete evidence, but it flatly rejects the
two abstract arguments it is presented: the argument for
equidistance based on natural law and the argument for
equidistance based on its evolution into customary
international law.

Because it was unable to find any

hard evidence supportive of the claim that the idea of
equidistance as a rule of law had been accepted by states
or known to them regardless of their assent, the Court
subsequently rejected that claim.

One cannot infer from

this observation, however, that the more abstract
arguments were rejected solely because of the fact of
abstraction.

Rather, what appears to concern the Court

is the lack of factual evidence to support the abstract
claims.
Again, it appears that the Court's decision is more
reflective of an adherence to rules and principles of
international law than the practices of a particular
legal tradition.

The majority represents almost equally

the common law and civil law traditions and the judges'
discovery and application of the law reflects methods and
habits from both of the traditions.
125

The judgment

manifests the common law's emphasis on facts and the
creation of law through concrete events yet evinces a
self-imposed limitation on the part of the justices
reminiscent of the civil law.

The Court's instructions

for the delimitation appear to be a product of common
law-like reasoning but fall short of qualifying as a
pragmatic resolution.

The guidelines they set instead

look more like an outline of the principles to which the
parties must conform in the process of delimitation.
None of the separate opinions filed in this case
represent a sharp divergence from the reasoning of the
judgment.

However one of the four separate opinions does

seem to lend weight to the proposition that legal
education and training of the justices determine how they
discover and apply the law.

Whereas the opinions of

Padillo Nervo, Bustamante y Rivero, and Ammoun do not
constitute a deviation from

t~e

majority on the discovery

or application of the law, Judge Jessup•s opinion appears
to be representative of the common law tradition.
Bustamante y Rivero, a judge educated under the civil
law, submitted a reservation regarding one paragraph in
the Court's decision wherein a comparison was made
126
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between drawing lateral boundaries on an equidistance
basis for territorial waters and doing the same for
delimitation of a continental shelf. 320

Bustamante y

Rivero expressed concern over bringing territorial water
delimitation into the decision as it is also a
controversial issue between states and also was not a
source of the dispute in the present case. 321
Civil law judge Padillo Nervo chose to append a
separate opinion for the purposes of further justifying
the Court's rejection of the argument that Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention had evolved into customary
international law. 322

He examined in greater detail the

principles agreed upon by the Parties to the Geneva
Convention prior to its drafting and concluded that the
States at Geneva "did not intend to accept the
equidistance method as a general rule of law from which
they could not depart and which would be binding on them
in all cases. " 323
Judge Ammoun, educated under the civil law, agreed
with the Court's position that the equidistance principle
was not opposable as a rule of treaty-law to Germany. 324
He nonetheless argued that the Parties could employ the
127

equidistance-special circumstances method as derived from
the general principle of law equity praeter legem. 325
In an opinion which seemed to be directed more to the
Parties than to the Court itself, common law judge Jessup
pointed out that that the real issue underlying the
dispute over the delimitation of the North Sea involved
the exploitation of the oil and gas resources. 326

He

expressed curiosity over why the Parties chose to argue
on other legal principles which were "sometimes advanced
with almost academic detachment from realities.

11327

He

even appeared to be advising the Parties as to how they
ought to proceed with the negotiations as he discussed
the possibility of an agreement between the Parties based
on the principle of joint exploitation of the resources
in the continental shelf. 328

Lastly, Jessup reminded the

Parties of their right to return to Court in the event
that they need further guidance during the process of
negotiation. 329
Undoubtedly, Justice Jessup's perception of the role
of the Court in this dispute was quite different from the
perception of the majority and Bustamente y Rivero and
Padillo Nervo.

Jessup goes beyond directly answering the
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question submitted by the Parties and advises them on how
they might have presented a better argument.

He in fact

informs them that their arguments exclude the real
problem at hand, division of economic resources, and thus
miss the point.

He offers suggestions about negotiation

that were not raised by the Parties or the Court and in
the end extends an invitation to the Parties to return to
Court if they are unable to reach a resolution.

Clearly,

in this case Jessup views his role on the Court as
involving more than strict application of the law created
by states.

Indeed Jessup typifies the common law judge;

he steps outside of the limits imposed on him and the
other justices by the Parties and proceeds to address
issues and problems with which he is troubled.

Although

he doesn't appear to be trying to create law in his
opinion, Jessup does appear to be trying to define for
the states the dispute between them.

He is essentially

telling the States that they misunderstood the problem or
at least misrepresented it and that he understands it
correctly.
Jessup's common law roots are even more evident in
his suggestion to the Parties that they consider joint
129
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application as a remedy for the problem.

He appears to

be more concerned with a practical, workable solution to
the problem and is willing to state it in his own opinion
rather than confine himself to the majority's more vague
and principled set of instructions.

In this case, then,

Jessup meets the expectations one might have of a common
law judge on the World Court.

He affirms the majority's

reasoning, which I identified as reflective of common
law, and subsequently applies the law in a flexible and
creative manner representative of the common law
tradition.
The dissenters were a slightly more diverse group
then the majority.

They included the only judge educated

under a Socialist system, Koretsky, plus two justices
educated in· civil law systems, Bengzon and Morelli, and
one justice, Tanaka, who was educated under the Asian
legal tradition and both common and civil law.

The

dissenting group also included a justice who represented
the Socialist state but was educated under the civil law
and underwent formative training in a common law legal
system, Manfred Lachs.
Koretsky proposed a different interpretation of how
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a principle in international law becomes a rule binding
upon all states.

He argued that the function of

international conferences and treaty-making is to codify
principles and rules that have taken shape in state
practice, in essence it is to express the opinio juris
regarding particular state practices. 33°

Koretsky reasoned

that the principles and rules embodied in the Geneva
Convention, including the equidistance-special
circumstances method, were thus part of customary
international law and applicable to this dispute. 331
Finally, he observed that not one of the parties to the
Geneva Convention opposed in any general way the
principles and rules embodied in Article 6, although some
states had reservations about specific geographical
locations . 332
One could not conclude that Judge Koretsky discovered
and applied the law in a manner reflective of the
Socialist legal tradition under which he was educated.
His opinion does reveal what one might consider more
abstract and theoretical concerns, however, as I
demonstrated in Chapter Two, the civil law tradition is
equally as concerned with substantive, philosophic
131

problems as the Socialist legal tradition.
support for this conclusion lies in

Further

Koretsky's lengthy

and explanatory dissenting opinion which directly
contradicts the expectations for a Socialist judge laid
out in Chapter Two.
The other judge trained in Socialist law, Lachs, came
to a conclusion similar to Koretsky.

Lachs found

evidence for claim that the equidistance principle had
become a principle of customary international law
obligatory on all states in state practice and in the
fact that it is part of the Geneva Convention and has
been accepted by the International Law Commission. 333
Lachs argued that the object and purpose of the Geneva
Convention, as with all multilateral treaties, limits the
freedom of states to make reservations to wellestablished principles of international law. 334

He

objected to Germany's claim that if the equidistance
method applied to this dispute the special circumstances
rule would have to go into effect because the method
would allot Germany a lesser portion of the continental
shelf than the Netherlands and Denmark.

Lachs insisted

that a lesser portion does not constitute "special
132
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circumstances.

11335

In light of his diverse background, it seems that one
cannot pinpoint which legal tradition, if any, might have
determined the way in which Lachs discovered and applied
the law in this case.

He is clearly looking at the

dispute as a matter of legal principle and he worries
more about the theoretical evolution of law than the
formation of law as evidenced in state practice.

This

perspective is representative of the civil law tradition
and the socialist legal tradition which it influenced.
On the other hand, Lachs does not ignore state practice
and opinio juris and finds examples of the equidistance
method being employed by States.
historical facts and the

This attention to the

lengthy, assertive dissenting

opinion reveal Lachs's common law roots.

It appears in

Lachs's case, then, that o'ne cannot know for certain if
it was the civil law legal education that influenced his
opinion or his training under the common law and then
Socialist law.
One is led to make similar conclusions about Judge
Tanaka's dissent.

Tanaka began by mentioning five

Agreements between states as examples of the application
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of the equidistance principle concerning the North Sea
continental shelf and thus, as evidence for the
recognition as customary international law this method of
delimitation on the basis of state practice. 336

He

proceeded to analyze the process known as customary
international law, characterizing it as sociological
process.

He acknowledged that the formation of the

equidistance method as a principle customary
international law was speedy and attributed this
speediness to a number of sociological factors including
the Geneva Convention. 337

He remarked that although it may

not have been signed by all states,

"the coming into

existence of the Geneva Convention itself would
psychologically and politically facilitate the adherence
of the non-party States to the Convention or the
introduction of the equidistance principle into their
practice.

11338

Tanaka cited additional factors for his

position including the urgent necessity of avoiding
international conflict between coastal states, and the
fact that a vacuum existed in the law of continental
shelf that was filled by the Geneva Convention. 339
Tanaka distinguished between legal positivists and
134

-

-------

... ---..-- -·--~

--- ---.-- ·--

--

... ~

others who see law as existing apart from the states and
placed himself in the latter category.
the essence of law is that it is

11

He stated that

an objective order vis

a vis those who are subject to it, and governing above
them ...

°

1134

Finally, he admonished the Court for failing

to take advantage of the opportunity presented to it in
this case to make a contribution to the progressive
development of international law. 341
Tanaka's opinion does not fit neatly into one legal
tradition.

Instead, it embodies methods that one might

associate with at least two legal traditions.

His

immediate focus on factual evidence is typical of a
common law approach to discovering law.

His critical

analysis of the theoretical construct known as customary
international law is characteristic of a civil law
approach to discovering law.
The position he takes on the law in opposition to the
positivist approach might also be considered
characteristic of a civil law approach to judicial
decision.

However, it might be more reflective of the

Asian legal tradition under which Tanaka spent most of
his legal career.

Although the Asian legal tradition is
135
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not part of the focus in this project, I

think it

appropriate to submit that the idea of law as an
objective order independent of its subjects is
fundamental to the Japanese legal order. 342

Moreover, the

heavy influence of both common law and civil law on the
Japanese legal system makes a determination about whether
Tanaka's methods for discovering and applying the law
were a result of education in civil law and common law
countries or the outcome of his history as a Japanese
legal professional very difficult to make. 343
The final dissenter was Justice Morelli, a civil law
judge.

Morelli disagreed with the Court's rejection of

the equidistance method as a principle of customary
international law binding upon Germany for the
delimitation of the North Sea.

His analysis of the

dispute and of the questions of law at hand was
representative of the quintessential civil law judge.
devoted most of his opinion to an exegesis of the
principle of equidistance in general and to the
principles of law governing the delimitation of
continental shelves.

His support of the equidistance

principle rested on the international legal principle
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known as contiguity and not on state practice:
I consider the rule of general international law
prescribing the equidistance criterion for the
delimitation of the continental shelve of various
states to be a necessary consequence of the
apportionment effected by general international
law on the basis of contiguity.
I am therefore
of the opinion that it is not necessary to ascertain if a specific custom has come into existence in this connection. State practice in this
field is relevant not as a constitutive element
of a custom which creates a rule, but rather as
a confirmation of such rule. Confirmation of
the rule is also provided, within certain. limits,
by the provisions of the Geneva Convention. 344

Morelli argued that written agreements between states
are only declaratory in character and do no more than
"record a situation which has already arisen
automatically." 345

In his search for the law, Morelli did

not at any point engage in a discussion of the particular
facts of the delimitation of the North Sea.

Instead, he

sought to access and explain the abstract principles of
international law existing prior to international
agreements and state practice in the area of continental
shelf delimitation.

He began with an analysis of the

rights conferred upon states regarding continental
shelves and proceeded to deduce to the rule or criterion
of apportionment known as contiguity. 346
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hinged on the logical procession from the notion of
contiguity to the idea of proximity which led, finally,
to the principle of equidistance. 347
Justice Morelli appears to have perceived his role as
judge as a relatively modest one.

He reasoned through

the problem from a strict theoretical approach and did
not appear to be attempting to make new law or to be
directing states to develop better law.

He found what he

believed to be the law by inferring from international
legal principles;

he did not make broad statements about

how states should or should not be acting nor did he
pronounce on what the role of international law and the
Court ought to be.

Justice Morelli appears to have

applied the law in civil law-like fashion.
The analysis of the votes and decisions in the North
Sea Cases indicates that, with the exception of perhaps
two justices, the legal tradition under which a justice
was educated and trained did not determine the way in
which he discovered and applied the law in this case.
The majority was represented, almost equally, by the
civil and common law traditions, and from the analysis of
the judgment one is led to conclude that the judges
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appear to have been guided more by the constraints
established for them by international law than by the
legal traditions under which they studied law and became
legal professionals.
Of the four individuals who filed separate opinions,
Justice Jessup, a common law judge from the United
States, is the only one whose discovery and application
of the law seemed to reflect the legal tradition under
which he was educated and trained.

Finally, one of the

dissenting opinions, Justice Morelli's could be
characterized as highly representative of the legal
tradition under which its author was educated and
trained.

All of the other dissenters employed methods

for either discovering or applying the law which were
typical of the legal tradition under which they were
educated and/or trained but also employed methods
characteristic of other legal traditions.
One might conclude that the opinions of Tanaka and
Lachs were reflective of their diverse legal experience.
Recall that these justices had an eclectic legal
background each having affiliations with three different
legal traditions.

While it might be the case that these
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justices discovered and applied the law in ways typical
of their legal background, one should be cautious about
drawing such a conclusion from this analysis.

Since most

of the other justices employed methods for deciding the
case that are representative of more than one legal
tradition, the opinions of Tanaka and Lachs are not
unusual in that respect.
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CHAPTER FIVE

ICJ III: THE CASE CONCERNING CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN
NAURU, JUDGMENT (PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS)

(JUNE 26,

1992) 348

Facts and Arguments:
The factual point of origin of this case is a
trusteeship established by the United Nations over the
now independent state of Nauru located in Micronesia.

In

1947 three states, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New
Zealand were established as the Administering Authority
(AA) vested with the authority to exercise the
administration of Nauru. 349

In 1951 the Nauru Local

Government Council (NLGC) was created to represent the
Nauruan community and to perform local administrative
functions. 350
According to Nauru, in the following decade and on
several occasions, the NLGC approached the United Nations
with concerns about the rehabilitation of phosphate lands
in Nauru which had been worked-out to near depletion by
141
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the British Phosphate Commissioners under the leadership
of the AA. 351

Specifically, Nauru requested that the

states composing the AA bear responsibility for financing
the rehabilitation of the lands.

An attempt to resolve

the issue was made in 1967 with the promulgation of an
Agreement between the NLGC, on the one hand, and the
three states of the AA, on the other, by which, according
to Australia, Nauru waived its claims to rehabilitation
of the phosphate lands by the states composing the AA. 352
Ellen Fitzgerald identifies the fundamental legal
issue in this case as the nature of the trust obligation
in international law. 353

She argues that the Court, in

reaching a decision in this case, would be faced with-the
following questions:
11

sacred trust

11

What was the character of the

in which Australia supervised the social,

political and economic existence of Nauru until its
independence in 1968?

In examining the nature of the

trusteeship in general, can one test its potency to
determine when or how such a trust is violated?
the consequences of such a breach ? 354

What are

Ramon E. Reyes, Jr.

agrees that the nature of a trust lies at the heart of
this dispute and comments that this case "raised
142

interesting questions of international law concerning
accountability for the operations and conduct in a trust
territory .

11 355

Antony Anghie finds additional significant legal
issues framing this dispute.

He notes that the case

11

is

the first instance of a former dependent territory
bringing action against a metropolitan authority for
abusing its power when administering the dependent
territory.

11356

Thus it raises the issue of colonialism.

Additionally, Anghie observes, the case also presents
"the stark plight of a people whose verdant island
home .. has been transformed by mining into a scarred
wasteland.

11357

Thus, it confronts the Court with the

question of environmental damage and when and how to
remedy it . 358
As this judgment was on the preliminary objections
and not on the merits, the Court, at this phase, did not
have to adjudicate on some of these larger legal issues
identified above.

Nauru's claims and Australia's

objections submitted at this phase were intended to
address the question of the.Court's jurisdiction and the
admissibility of Nauru's application.
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In its pleadings and in oral arguments before the
Court, Nauru argued that the Agreement did not resolve
the matter of rehabilitation of the phosphate lands and
that when the Trusteeship was terminated in 1968 the
dispute was still unsettled. 359

Nauru asked the Court to

adjudge and declare that Australia, due to its failure to
finance the rehabilitation of the worked out phosphate
lands in Nauru,

bears

following obligations:

res~onsibility

for breaching the

1) Article 76 the U.N. Charter

and Articles 3 and 5 the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru;
2) the international standards generally recognized as
applicable in the implementation of the principle of
self-determination; 3} the obligation to respect the
right of the Nauruan people to permanent sovereignty over
their natural wealth and resources; 4) the obligation of
international law not to exercise powers of
administration in such a way as to produce a denial of
justice lato sensu; 5} the obligation of general
international law not to exercise powers of
administration in such a way as to constitute an abuse of
rights; 6) the principle of general international law
that a State which is responsible for the administration
144
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of territory is under an obligation not to bring about
changes in the condition of the territory which will
cause irreparable damage to, or substantially prejudice,
the existing or contingent legal interest of another
State in respect of that territory.%0
Nauru requested that the Court find that it has a
legal entitlement to the Australian allocation of the
overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners
which were marshalled and disposed of in accordance with
the trilateral Agreement rather than shared with the
Nauruan people.% 1

Lastly, it asked the Court to declare

that Australia was under a duty to make appropriate
reparation in respect of the loss caused to Nauru as a
result of the breaches of its legal obligations. 362
In its defense, Australia advanced preliminary
objections to the application.

First, it invoked its

reservation to the optional clause excluding from the
Court's jurisdiction all those disputes between Australia
and other states which "the parties thereto have agreed
or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of
peaceful settlement. " 363

Second, it asserted that Nauru

had, during debates at the United Nations, waived any
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claims to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands by
Australia. 364

Australian officials argued third that their

government had been discharged of any obligation to
finance the rehabilitation in Nauru once the Trusteeship
had been terminated.%5

Fourth, they objected to the

Court's jurisdiction and inadmissibility of the
application on grounds that Nauru had allowed an
unreasonable amount of time to pass before its officials
filed a complaint with the Court. 366

Fifth, Australia

argued that Nauru had failed to act in good faith with
regard to the rehabilitation367 •

Sixth, it objected to the

dispute on grounds that New Zealand and the United
Kingdom were part of the AA yet were not parties to the
case and that a judgment by the Court would effect New
Zealand and the U. K. 368

Lastly, Australia contended that

Nauru's claim regarding the overseas assets of the BPC
was a new one. 369

Australia argued that for all of the

reasons stated above Nauru's application to the Court was
inadmissible and the Court lacked jurisdiction in this
matter.

Judgment:
146

The Court voted as follows:
1) 13 to 0 - rejected the preliminary

objectio~

based

on Australia's reservation to the optional
clause.

2) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on
an alleged waiver by Nauru, prior to accession to
independence, of all claims concerning the rehabilitation
of the phosphate lands worked out prior to 1 July 1967.

3) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on
the termination of the trusteeship over Nauru by the
United Nations.

4) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on
the effect of the passage of time on the admissibility of
Nauru's application.

5) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on
Nauru's alleged lack of good faith.

6) 9 to 4

- rejected the preliminary objection based on
147
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the fact that New Zealand and the United Kingdom were not
parties to the proceedings.

7) 13 to 0 - upheld the preliminary objection based on
the claim concerning the overseas assets of BPC
being a new one.

8) 9 to 4

- found that it has jurisdiction and the

application is admissible.

9) 13 to 0 - found that the claim regarding overseas
assets is inadmissible. 370
Majority = M
Dissent = D
Separate Opinion =

so

JUDGES-TRADITION
Jennings - common
Oda - common/asian
Lachs - civ/com/soc
Ago - civil
Schwebel - common
Bedjaoui - civil
Zhengyu - com/asian
Evensen - civ/com
Tarassov - social
Guillaume - civil
Shahabudden - comm
Ranjeva - civil
A. Mawdsley - civil

1

2

3

4

M
M
M
M
M
M

M

M

D

D
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This judgment is significantly more one-sided than
the previous two, i.e. the majority is quite larger in
this case then in the others I have analyzed.

This is

not an oversight, rather, the cases decided in ICJ III
thus far have not been as divisive as those in ICJ I and
ICJ II. In the decisions that have been rendered during
!CJ III up until the present, the justices have
overwhelmingly voted together.

This judgment represents

the widest split of votes in this era.
One might have further noticed that this judgment is
on the preliminary objections to the case.

This is not

problematic for the purposes of the study as questions of
jurisdiction at the ICJ are substantive ones rather than
procedural ones, as they are in municipal law, and thus,
the justices are making decisions and reasoning about
substantive law.
The only notable disagreement between the justices
in this case was on the matter of the exclusion of New
Zealand and the U.K. from the case, preliminary
objections six and eight.

The Court refused to uphold
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these objections stating that it could think of no reason
for declaring the Application inadmissible on these
grounds.n 1

It noted that in this case the interests of

New Zealand and the United Kingdom did not constitute the
very subject-matter of the judgment and that although a
finding by the Court regarding Australia's responsibility
concerning the phosphate lands might well have
implications for the legal situation of New Zealand and
the U.K., no finding in respect of that legal situation
would be needed as a basis for the Court's decision. 372
The Court further noted that states which are not
part of this case have permission to intervene. 373

The

Court ruled that the absence of the other states in the
case, however,

"in no way precludes the Court from

adjudicating upon the claims submitted to it.

11374

The

Court concluded that "the determination of the
responsibility of New Zealand or the United Kingdom is
not a prerequisite for the determination of the
responsibility of Australia.

11375

On the first preliminary objection, the Court
unanimously found Australia's reservation inapplicable to
the present dispute.

Nauru and Australia had not made
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any agreement to have recourse to some other peaceful
method of settlement in the event of a dispute over the
phosphate lands.n 6

The Court rejected the second

preliminary objection, Australia's claim that Nauru had
waived all claims related to rehabilitation of the
phosphate lands.

It found,

through an investigation of

negotiations for the 1967 Agreement and discussions at
the United Nations that Nauruan authorities "did not at
any time effect a clear and unequivocal waiver of their
claims ..... 377
After an analysis of discussions between Nauru, the
states comprising the AA, .and the United Kingdom during
the process of terminating the trusteeship, the Court
rejected the third preliminary objection.

According to

the Court, the facts showed that at the time of
termination of the trusteeship, everyone involved in the
termination, including the Trusteeship Council in the
United Nations and representatives in the General
Assembly, the members of the AA, and the Nauruans, was
aware of persistent disagreements between the NLGC and
the AA with regard to the rehabilitation of the phosphate
lands. 31s

And although the General Assembly resolution
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that terminated the trusteeship did not expressly reserve
any rights for Nauru with regard to the lands, it also
did not discharge the AA with respect to such rights. 379
The Court ruled that "the rights Nauru might have had in
connection with rehabilitation of the lands remained
unaffected.

u38o

Australia's fourth preliminary objection, regarding
the unreasonable passage of time between Nauruan
independence and the submission of the application to the
Court, was also rejected.

The Court argued that an

unreasonable passage of time may, in some instances,
render an application inadmissible.

However, since no

specific time limits have been set for the filing of an
application with the Court, the Court reasoned, it is the
responsibility of. the Court to determine, in each
individual case, if an unreasonable passage of time has
elapsed so as to render the application inadmissible. 381
After reviewing the history of correspondence between
Nauru and Australia with regard to the rehabilitation of
the phosphate lands, the Court ruled that the application
was admissible. 382
The Court readily struck down the fifth objection,
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alleging a violation of the principle of good faith on
behalf of Nauru.

It noted that Nauru submitted its

application properly and in accordance with the
international judicial process and that any further
judgment regarding good faith would amount to a decision
on the merits. 383
Lastly, the Court unanimously upheld Australia's
seventh and eighth objections wherein it argued that
Nauru's claim concerning the overseas assets of the
British Phosphate Commissioners was a new one and thus
inadmissible. The Court agreed that for a new claim to be
admissible it must either been implicit in the
application or it must have arisen directly out of the
question which is the subject matter. 384
neither standard was met.

It

f~und

that

The Court's examination of

Nauru's application showed that no reference to the
disposal of the overseas assets of the BPC appeared in it
except for a submission at the end asking the Court to
declare that it has a legal entitlement to the assets. 385
The justices also agreed that if they were to include
this claim on the merits, the subject of the dispute
would be necessarily altered.~
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With the exception of the sixth and eight
preliminary objections, the only dissents to the six
questions before the Court were produced by one
individual, Judge Oda from Japan, who dissented on all
but three of the votes.

Com:posi ti on of the court : 387
Sir Robert Jennings,

(United Kingdom):

Justice Jennings

was educated at Downing College, a common law institution
in Cambridge, before being awarded a fellowship at
Harvard University, another common law legal facility.
He remained in academia as a lecturer and published many
manuscripts on international law.

He also served as

legal adviser to various governments and as counsel in
numerous arbitrations.

Justice Jennings was a member of

the ICJ from 1982 to 1995.

Shigeru Oda, (Japan): Judge Oda earned a law degree from
the University of Tokyo and subsequently spent three
years studying under a common law system at Yale
University.

In Japan he became a full professor of

International Law and a diplomat.
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extremely active in the academic community and in the
international legal community.

He has served on the ICJ

since 1976.

Manfred Lachs,

(Poland):

Discussed in previous study, p.

119.
Roberto Ago,

(Italy): Judge Ago earned a doctorate of law

and political sciences from the civil law University of
Naples.

He has served as a professor of international

law at many Italian universities, headed a number of
Italian delegations to international conferences, and
served as counsel for various governments in cases before
the World Court.

Judge Ago served on the ICJ from 1979-

1995.

Stephen M. Schwebel,

(United States): Judge Schwebel

holds a law degree from Yale University but also studied
the law in Cambridge at Harvard College, both common law
institutions.

He has taught law at Harvard and Cambridge

Universities, served as legal adviser in the Department
of State, headed delegations to United Nations
committees, and authored countless articles on various
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matters in international law.

Judge Schwebel has been a

member of the ICJ since 1981.

Mohammed Bedjaoui, {Algeria): Judge Bedjaoui holds a
Diploma of the Institute of Political Studies at the
University of Grenoble.

Although his official

bibliography doesn't provide the name of the institution
where he holds a Doctor of Law, it appears that he earned
it either at the University of Grenoble or at an
institution in Algeria.

In either case, Bedjaoui was

educated under the civil law.

He has held many posts for

the Algerian government including Legal Adviser,
Secretary-General, Minister of Justice and Keeper of the
Seals, and Ambassador to France.

He has been a judge at

the ICJ since 1982.

Ni Zhengyu,

{China): In China, Judge Zhengyu was educated

at the Chitz, Soochow and Dongwu Universities.

He

received a Doctorate of Law from a common law school,
Stanford University. Soon after he began a long tenure as
Legal Counsel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in
this capacity represented the PRC at many international
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Judge Ni was a member of the ICJ from 1985-

1994.

Jens Evensen,

(Norway):

Justice Evensen holds a law

degree from Oslo University, a civil law institution and
a Doctorate from Harvard Law School, a common law
institution.

He also studied under the common law system

at Columbia and Minnesota Law Schools.

Evensen was a

public prosecutor and then a advocate at the Supreme
Court of Norway.

For over a decade he was the Director-

General of the legal Department of the Foreign Ministry.
He also attended many international conferences on behalf
of Norway.

Judge Evensen served on the ICJ from 1985-

1994.

Nikolai Konstantinovitch Tarassov,

(O.S.S.R. & Russia):

Tarassov was educated in the law at the Law Faculty of
Moscow University, a Socialist legal institution.

He has

occupied many positions for the Soviet and Russian
governments including Consultant to the Legal Department
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Head of the
Secretariat for the Secretary of the Presidium,
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Counsellor at the U.S.S.R. embassy in Iran, and
representative at the United Nations.

Judge Tarassov was

a judge on the ICJ from 1985-1994.

Gilbert Guillaume,

(France): Judge Guillaume received a

Bachelor's Degree in civil law from the University of
Paris.

He has been a Legal Adviser to France and a

French representative at many international conferences.
He was Director of Legal Affairs for France, representing
the government in many cases, and a professor at the
University of Paris.

Judge Guillaume has been a member

of the ICJ since 1987.

Mohamed Shahabuddeen,

(Guyana): Judge

Shahabuddeen studied law at London University, a common
law facility, where he obtained his LL.D. and Ph.D.

In

Guyana he was Solicitor General and then Attorney
General.

He also served as Minister of Justice and as

representative of Guyana to many international meetings.
Judge Shahabuddeen has been a member of the ICJ since
1988.
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Andres Aguilar Mawdsley,

Judge Aguilar

(Venezuela):

earned a Doctorate in Political and Social Sciences from
Caracas University, a civil law institution, and a
Master's Degree in Civil law from McGill University in
Montreal.

For one decade he was a lecturer in Venezualan

universities but left the academic realm to pursue a
career as a diplomat for his government.

Judge Aguilar

Mawdsley was on the ICJ from 1991-1995.

Raymond Ranjeva,

(Madagascar):

Judge Ranjeva also holds

degrees from two different countries.

In Madagascar he

obtained a degree in law and administration and a diploma
in political science and public law.

In Paris, a civil

law state, he earned another diploma in political science
and public law and also a Doctorate of Law.

Ranjeva has

occupied many positions in academia and government
including professor, Dean, Rector of the University of
Antananrivo, delegate at international conferences, and
counsel for Madagascar in international cases.
been a member of the ICJ since 1991.

Analysis:
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It is clear that legal tradition did not determine
the way in which the justices discovered and applied the
law in preliminary objections one, seven, and nine.

This

claim is justified by the fact that the Court was
composed of a fairly diverse group of justices
representing over five legal traditions and that there
were no dissents on these votes.
Once again what stands out in the judgment is a
method of discovering the law similar to the common law
approach.

In each decision, possibly with the exception

of the sixth objection, the justices referred to the
facts leading up to the dispute to make their decision.
In almost every vote, their decision followed from a
review of the discussions and correspondence that had
taken place between Nauru, Australia (and the other
states of the AA), and members of the bodies of the
United Nations involved in the trusteeship.
This common law style is also manifested in the
decision on the sixth objection involving the
admissibility of the application in light of New
Zealand's and the United Kingdom's absence.

To

demonstrate the law on this claim, the Court reviewed
160
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past court decisions by the PCIJ and ICJ and national
courts.

Although the Court's deference to previous court

rulings does not necessarily amount to an acceptance of
the principle of stare decisis,

this method for

discovering the law is characteristic of the common law
system founded on the notion of precedent and
uncharacteristic of the civil law and socialist law
traditions. 388
The Court's application of the law does not appear
to reflect any particular legal tradition, or perhaps
more accurately it evidences elements of all three of the
legal traditions examined in Chapter Two with no one of
them overrepresented.· The judgment does not signal a
group of powerless, deferential judges looking outward
for the law, as one might expect from a socialist or
civil law judge.
Indeed, in its answer to the question of a reasonable
time of passage, the Court stated without equivocation
that it possesses the authority to determine what
constitutes an unreasonable passage of time.

Further, it

upheld its jurisdiction over the case on the matter of
the absence of the United Kingdom and New Zealand even
161
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though the law surrounding the legal interests of third
states might be regarded as somewhat vague.
The Court, on the other hand, does not apply the law
in traditional common law fashion.

There is no evidence

to suggest that the justices wielded expansive authority
and created law apart from the law created by states.
They concerned themselves strictly with the practice
between Australia and Nauru and refrained from making
declarations of law which had no basis in state practice
or international agreements.
Judge Shahabuddeen filed a separate opinion for the
purposes of explicating the reasons why he agreed with
the Court on the sixth preliminary objection.

He argued

that even if one assumed that the obligations under
question applied to all three of the states comprising
the AA, the

suit could be brought against Australia

alone (as opposed to a suit against Australia, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom) . 389

He observed that

Australia had been given the leading role in
administering Nauru and that it had exclusive authority
to administer Nauru for all practical purposes. 3~
Shahabuddeen dismissed Australia's claim that it did not
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possess authority over the phosphate industry stating
that the extent of Australia's authority over Nauru was
so great as to include the overwhelming bulk of the
territory's economy. 391

He concluded that the United

Kingdom and New Zealand had virtually no input into the
administration of Nauru. 392
Shahabuddeen referred to statements made by the ILC
and to municipal law, including the law of torts in
English Law, and writings of publicists as supportive of
the position that a state could be sued alone even if it
shared the obligation at issue with another state or
states. 393

The judgment, he maintained, only applies to

the state being sued and does not impose legal
responsibility on the states absent from the case.
Shahabuddeen, a common law educated judge, appears
to have reasoned the problem in a way similar to the
majority.
do~s

In fact he clearly states that his opinion

not diverge from the Court's judgment but

supplements it and provides further support for its
conclusions.

Like the majority, Shahabuddeen discovers

the law through an analysis of the facts of the case and
applies it in a way that is not reflective of one legal
163

tradition in particular.

Also like the majority,

Shahabuddeen's approach to decision-making cannot
necessarily be attributed to his common law education as
it was shown that the same approach was taken by civil
law and Socialist law judges in the Court's judgment.
Preliminary objections two,

three, four, and five

provide further support for the conclusion that legal
tradition did not determine the decision-making of the
majority.

One justice, Oda from Japan, dissented on all

of these four votes plus votes six and eight.

An

analysis of his dissent, however, shows that Oda took the
same approach to discovering the law as the majority.
In his decision, Oda was primarily concerned with
what he perceived to be Nauru's past silence on the
matter of the rehabilitation of the worked-out phosphate
lands.

He meticulously reviewed all of the facts of the

case, including all correspondence between Nauru and
Australia and Nauru and the United Nations regarding the
rehabilitation of the lands and found that Nauru failed,
on several crucial occasions, to express to Australia the
concerns about the financing of the rehabilitation that
it eventually brought before the Court. 394
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Australia's contention that Nauru waived its claim to
rehabilitation of the worked-out phosphate lands by
failing to reserve the claim in the 1967 Agreement
between the States. 395

He further pointed out

that Nauru

was totally silent on the issue of rehabilitation on the
date of its independence. 396

This continued silence, Oda

argued, leads one to the conclusion that Nauru waived the
claim to rehabilitation of the lands. 397
Oda upheld Australia's preliminary objection based
on the passage of time between Nauruan independence and
its

submission of the Application to the Court.

Again

he noted that no claim was put forward when it should
have been, at the time of Nauruan independence. 398
found,

through an examination of the facts,

Oda

that Nauru

had kept silent on the matter for fifteen years and
therefore violated the principle of good faith by failing
to act with due diligence. 399

Oda concluded his decision

by stating that he hoped Australia will consider
assisting Nauru in the rehabilitation as the latter is a
newly independent state and thus in a vulnerable natural
and social

situation.~

0

Oda's meticulous attention to the factual history of
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the dispute is characteristic of a common law approach to
discovering the law.

This was the preliminary phase of

the case and the Court wasn't asked to decide on the
merits, but justices still must determine what law
governs the dispute and apply it to the dispute to
determine if the Court has jurisdiction over the dispute.
Like the majority, Oda looked to the correspondence
between Nauru and Australia and the United Nations to
discover whether there was evidence for the claim that
Australia had breached its international obligations.
Oda applied the law in a way similar to the
majority.

He did not go beyond the boundaries

established by international law, as would a traditional
common law judge, by attempting to create law that did
not already exist in written agreements or state
practice.

On the other hand, his encouragement to

Australia to assist Nauru in the rehabilitation of the
phosphate lands might be regarded as evidence of a common
law orientation towards judicial decision which
emphasizes creativity and independent thought.
It appears that Oda was divided from the majority by
virtue of the way he interpreted the facts.
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When he

looked at the history of the dispute, he saw something
very different than what was seen by the rest of the
Court; where the Court saw Nauru making repeated attempts
to resolve the disagreement, Oda saw silence.

Therefore

it was in the interpretation of the facts, not the
importance of them, that led to Oda's dissent.
By nine votes to four the Court rejected Australia's
preliminary objection based on the fact that New Zealand
and the United Kingdom were not parties to the
proceedings.
Schwebel.

The dissenters were Jennings, Oda, Ago, and

Jennings, a common law educated judge from

Britain, applied the formula from the case of the
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 401 which limits the
Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over a case if a
third state's

11

legal interests would not only be affected

by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of
the decision.

11402

Jennings asserted that the legal

interests of the United Kingdom and New Zealand would
form the subject matter of any decision in Nauru's case
against Australia and therefore the Court lacked
jurisdiction. 403
Jennings noted that if the Court was to find
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Australia liable for breaching its international legal
obligations, an assessment of damages would be made.
Since New Zealand and the United Kingdom were part of the
AA and the BPC, he argued, any assessment would clearly
and unavoidably be a decision in respect of the legal
states.~

interests of the other two

4

He reasoned that the

Court lacked the jurisdiction to make a decision
affecting the other two states. 405
Jennings's dissent is typical of the common law
tradition.

He discovered the rule of law in a prior

court ruling and applied it to the present dispute to
reach a conclusion about these particular circumstances.
He mentioned three of the
inextricable involvement,

11

11

salient instances of the
of the legal interests of the

United Kingdom and Australia and ruled that these facts
alone lead to the conclusion that the subject-matter of
the decision would be formed by the legal interests of
the two states. 406
Although one might be able to demonstrate that
Jennings's discovery of the law was determined by his
legal education, his application of the law was more
representative of the civil law tradition.
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was very brief and to the point and it lacked any
evidence that he perceived his role as creative of law.
It appears that he did not expand his reasoning to
include his own personal beliefs about the law or this
particular dispute.
One must not overlook the fact that Jennings' native
state, the U.K., had an interest in this case.

As the

United Kingdom was one of the Parties potentially
affected by the Court's decision, in all likelihood the
British government would like to have seen the Court
dismiss the case.

Even if this judgment was not directly

applicable to the United Kingdom or New Zealand, one
would suppose that if Nauru was victorious at the ICJ, a
suit against the other two countries might be forthcoming
and that the judgment against those two states would be
similar to the one against Australia.
Some observers might infer from this fact that
Jennings's opinion was politically motivated.

They would

probably argue that Jennings felt it his duty to uphold
the interests of the United Kingdom.

They might contend,

moreover that his own political convictions

paralleled

the position of the British government and thus he may
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have been disallowed from ruling in favor of Nauru.
However, their claims would be difficult to support as
Jennings's opinion does not provide any evidence
indicating that he voted in opposition to the majority
out of devotion to his government.

One would be hard-

pressed to find any statements or insinuations in the
opinion which would justify such a conclusion.
The third common law dissenter, Justice Schwebel,
argued that private law sources and analogies are
unhelpful in international law where jurisdiction is
consensual. 4~

Schwebel turned to ICJ cases to determine

the law on the question of involving New Zealand and the
United Kingdom in the dispute.
dissent in Nicaragua v.

U.S. 4~

Schwebel pointed to his
and to the Land, Island and

Maritime Frontier Dispute 409 between El Salvador and
Honduras as supportive of the principle that if the legal
interests of a third state will not merely be affected
but effectively determined by the Court's judgment, the
Court should not proceed to give judgment in the absence
of that third state. 410

Looking towards the facts,

Schwebel found that all of Australia's actions with
regard to the governance of Nauru were on behalf of the
170
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three states collectively. 411

He concluded that a judgment

on Australian responsibility would be a judgment on the
responsibility of the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
Judge Schwebel's opinion is a classic example of the
common law style.

Although he disapproves of the Court's

use of private law sources and analogies, he applies the
common law method of examining cases to discover the law.
More significant is the fact that Schwebel chose his own
dissenting opinion in Nicaragua v. U.S. 412 as supportive of
his legal position in this case.

In the domain of

international law, cases do not establish precedent, and
moreover, dissenting opinions are not deemed to be
creative of law.

Schwebel's reference to his own

dissenting opinion is indicative of a judge who views his
own decisions, even if they are dissents, as noteworthy
and as potential rules and principles of law.

As I

pointed out in Chapter Two, in common law systems it is
not uncommon for dissenting opinions to eventually become
the law of the land as standards, norms, and ideals
change.

Thus in common law systems, dissenting opinions

are not only regularly written but are highly valued.
Schwebel's reliance on his own dissenting opinion in
171
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a previous case, an opinion which was incidentally the
source of much controversy in the international legal
community, is a clear example of a common law discovery
and application of the law.

Schwebel discovered the law

through an analysis of the cases and in typical common
law form displayed independence and authority by
supplying his own opinion, which was not accepted as
binding in the first case, as binding in the present
case.

He devoted much time in this dissenting opinion to

an explanation of his position in the Nicaragua case,
again evidencing a belief that his independent opinion is
one that has significant consequences for international
law.
It appears in this case, then, that Schwebel
discovered and applied the law in a manner consistent
with his legal education and training.
hinges

His decision

entirely on terms of past PCIJ and ICJ rulings

and the facts of this particular dispute.

And he expands

the international judicial role to allow for more
creativity, authority, and independence.
The final dissenter, Judge Ago, is an Italian
educated in the civil law.

Ago objected to the Court's
172

decision regarding the absence of the United Kingdom and
the New Zealand because as he saw it there existed an
insurmountable contradiction between two facts:

l)Nauru

brought suit against Australia alone and; 2) the task of
administering Nauru was entrusted to three distinct
sovereign states. 413 Ago argued that the authority
conferred by the United Nations was done on the basis of
the legal equality of the three powers. 414

He conceded

that Australia may have, as other judges have pointed
out, discharged more tasks than the other two states but
argues that this fact can

11

in no way affect the

fundamental situation of equality of rights and
obligations between three partners ..

11415

Ago contended that Nauru had every reason to bring
action against all three of the states as opposed to
Australia alone. 416

He pointed out that Nauru chose not to

sue all of the states and thus reasoned that a ruling by
the Court on these claims against Australia

11

will,

inevitably, affect the legal situation of the two other
states, namely, their rights and obligations.

11417

He

concluded that a judgment by the Court would deprive it
of its

11

indispensable consensual basis.
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Ago's civil law roots are manifest in his repeated
concern with the rights and obligations of Australia and
New Zealand.

However, he never clearly explicated those

principles, as would a traditional civil law judge.
Additionally, he stated at the outset that his argument
hinges on the existence of two
contradictory facts 11

•

11

insurmountable

It is these facts, he argued, that

lead him to a conclusion different from the majority.
Ago's application of the law also fails to conform
neatly into one legal tradition.

His opinion constitutes

a firm dissent, an exercise discouraged in both the civil
law and socialist law traditions.

However, it doesn't

evidence the independence, creativity, and authority on
display in Schwebel's opinion.

Ago, like Oda, seems to

have interpreted the facts in such a way as to come to a
conclusion in

oppositio~

to that of the majority.

The analysis of this case is similar to the analyses
of the cases before it: it appears that with the
exception of two justices, Schwebel and perhaps Jennings,
the justices did not discover and apply the law in a
manner consistent with the legal traditions under which
they were educated.

The votes alone represent clear and
174
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convincing evidence that legal tradition did not
determine how the justices discovered and applied the
law.

The analysis provides further support for this

conclusion.
One noteworthy observation is the solidarity of the
judges educated and trained in civil law states.

With

one exception, Ago, they all voted with the majority.
This observation may not shed much light on the judicial
decision-making process as the discovery and application
of the law in the judgment was not reflective of only
civil law.
The only two judges on the Court educated and
trained exclusively in the common law tradition, Jennings
and Schwebel, dissented from the majority.

Both of these

opinions exhibited definite common law predispositions.
Jennings appeared to have discovered the law in typical
common law fashion,

through an application of case law,

but doesn't seem to have adhered to that tradition when
applying the law.

I also noted above that one must

consider the argument that Jennings's decision was
dictated by the fact that the United Kingdom had an
ostensive interest in the case.
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I attempted to refute

this argument by demonstrating that there was no evidence
to support it.
Schwebel appears to discover and apply the law in
quintessential common law style.

One might argue that

his opinion was also the product of political interests
and that the United States's alliances with the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand dictated Schwebel's
decision-making.

This thesis appears to be refuted,

however, by Schwebel's previous dissent in the Nicaragua
case which, he argues, is consistent with his dissent in
this case.

If Schwebel's position is truly consistent,

then it appears that he may have carved out a legal
position that was applicable to both cases.
In the following chapter I will make some
concluding remarks about the findings from these case
studies, the controversy over the convergence or
divergence of the civil and common law traditions, and
how judicial decision at the World Court may or may not
shed light on that debate.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

I noted in Chapter One that this project does not
aim to determine uin what exact proportion" legal
tradition might influence judicial decision at the
International Court of Justice.

Nor is this thesis an

effort to detect all of the factors which possibly
influence an ICJ judge's thinking.

Instead, the aim is a

more modest one.
Again the purpose of this exercise was to ascertain
to what extent the legal tradition under which an ICJ
justice was educated and trained in the law determines
how she or he decides an international legal dispute.
The best possible approach to answering this question
might be to analyze each and every case the ICJ has
decided in the manner I have done here.

However, the

limitations associated with a thesis project precluded me
from analyzing nearly 80 court cases.
This exploratory exercise constitutes a less
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comprehensive, yet still informative method, of
discovering whether and to what extent legal tradition
determines how an ICJ justice finds and applies the law.
Although I did not examine each and every case decided by
the Court, the cases analyzed in the foregoing pages are
the most divisive of the era in which they were decided,
i.e., they represent the widest split of votes, and thus
were the most likely cases to reflect differences between
judicial decisions based on legal tradition.

In other

words these three cases constitute a sample from all of
the ICJ cases that, when put to analysis, can provide an
answer to the question of this project without
prejudicing the outcome of the study.
The analysis of the Right of Passage case yielded
little evidence to support the claim that legal tradition
determines how an ICJ judge finds and applies the law.
Although there was evidence to indicate that the civil
law dissenters may have employed methods of discovering
and applying the law traceable to their legal education
and that the Socialist judges may have disagreed because
of their different legal educations, the decision by the
majority and the opinions of the common law dissenters
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seemed to be more reflective of the rules of
international law which have created for the justices a
particular role with identifiable constraints.

Moreno

Quintana s dissent lent further support to the claim that
1

legal tradition was not an important variable in judicial
decision as his opinion seemed to be motivated by
political convictions rather than legal rules and
principles.

Thus, if the legal tradition under which an

ICJ justice was educated and trained mattered to the
judicial decision-making process in this dispute, it was
only in the case of four justices:

two civil law

dissenters and two socialist dissenters.
- The analysis of the decisions in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases produced similar results.

Of the

fifteen permanent justices who contributed to that
decision, only two, Morelli and Jessup, seemed to find
and apply the law in a way reflective of the legal
tradition under which they were educated and trained.
The rest of the justices appeared to have been guided by
the rules of international law that have been laid down
by the states.

They found the law through an analysis of

state practice and kept their function limited to a
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direct answer to the question asked by the Parties to the
dispute.
The same can be said of the Court in the Case of the
Phosphate Lands in Nauru.

Only two of the justices,

Jennings and Schwebel, appeared to have been discovering
the law in a fashion typical of their legal tradition,
the common law.

And only one of them, Schwebel, applied

the law in common law style.

The majority, like the

majorities in the previous two cases, discovered the law
like common law jurists, looking to concrete facts, but
applied in traditional civil law fashion, modestly and
with restraint.
If these three cases are truly representative of how
the justices on the ICJ decide cases, then it appears
that legal tradition plays, at the most, a very minimal
role in judicial decision-making at the ICJ.

In each of

the cases the majority employed methods from more than
one legal tradition; thus most of the justices on the
Court did not find and apply the law in a manner
reflective of the legal tradition under which they were
educated and trained.
Nonetheless, the fact that most of the justices at
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the ICJ were not influenced by legal tradition in their
decision does not mean that legal traditions have no
significance at the World Court.

In two of the cases the

American judge adjudicated in traditional common law
style.

In one case the British judge discovered the law

as would a common law judge.

In two of the cases at

least one civil law judge employed tactics of legal
reasoning representative of his legal tradition.

And in

one case the divergence of two Socialist judges might be
explained by reference to their distinct legal education
and training.
The analysis of the three cases at the ICJ leads one
to conclude that while the legal tradition under which a
judge is educated and trained may not determine how she
or he discovers and applies the law in most cases, it may
in a few cases influence (to what degree is unknown) how
a judge at the ICJ reasons and delivers a decision.

In

other words, legal tradition may not be a significant
variable in judicial decision-making, however, one should
not hastily disregard it in every case as unimportant.
One might also conclude from the analysis that
political or national interest is not a significant
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variable in judicial decision at the !CJ.

Only one

justice in the entire study, Moreno Quintana in the Right
of Passage Case, evidenced a concern with the political
implications of his vote and, possibly, voted
accordingly.

I raised the possibility that critics of

Judge Jennings's vote in the Phosphate Lands Case might
attribute his decision to national interest, but I also
noted that his opinion did not substantiate these claims.
One pattern that stands out in these three cases
involves the judgments of the majority of the Court.

In

each of these cases the judgment manifests a reliance on
common law methods for discovering the law and civil law,
and perhaps socialist law,

law.

techniques for applying the

In each of this cases the Court finds the law

through an interpretation and analysis of the facts of
the case and, if they exist, state practice and
international agreements on the legal issue under
scrutiny.

In its search for the law, the Court appears

to worry less about what justice requires or what, in
·principle, is the "correct" answer to the problem and
more about the history of the legal relations between the
states.
182

--~----------------

------ --- - - -

...

-----

.....

---- ---

On the other hand, the majority in each of these
cases applies the law in civil law style.

There is no

evidence to support the claim that the majority tried to
create law or establish international precedent.

Nor is

there any indication in the judgments of a majority that
perceives itself as highly independent or influential.
Rather, the majority seems to perceive its role as
relatively limited.

In each of the cases the judgment

supplies an answer to the question or disagreement posed
by the Parties; the majority appears to try to restrict
its reach to those legal issues the Parties ask the Court
to resolve and which the Court sees as within its
jurisdiction.
When one considers the context in which the justices
at the ICJ are adjudicating legal disputes, this pattern
on display in their judgments may not be surprising.
Because international law and international legal
institutions, like the ICJ, govern states and are created
and interpreted by states, the World Court faces
constraints that domestic courts may not.

It faces the

dilemma of trying authoritatively to solve disputes
between states which have, through the United Nations,
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created the Court and have the authority to abolish the
it.

If states cherish their sovereignty as much as most

observers of international politics argue they do, then
the Court must walk a fine line between upholding
international law in the face of violations by states and
respecting the states's right of

sovereignty.

An

activist, independent World Court that ignores the
realities of international politics might effectively
create its own demise.

The Court's emphasis on the

concrete facts of the case and its unwillingness to
answer questions not asked of it seems understandable
then, given its position in the international legal
structure.,

ARE COMMON LAW & CIVIL LAW REALLY DIFFERENT?

In Chapter Two I introduced and discussed the debate
over the convergence and/or divergence of the common law
and civil law traditions and suggested that the case
studies might shed light on the debate.

It seems that

the ICJ might be an appropriate context within which to
draw some limited conclusions about this debate as the
~184
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World Court is perhaps one of the only tribunals with
judges from different legal traditions deciding the same
case.
Although the judgments of these three cases, if they
reflect a Court constrained by international law as
opposed to a Court applying methods from two traditions,
may not help settle the debate, the breakdown of votes
might.

As we saw in each of the cases, the majority

represented a combination of civil law and common law
judges.

In none of these cases did the civil law judges

build a coalition opposed to the common law judges or
vice-versa; the votes did not fall along lines of legal
tradition.

In all of these cases, civil law and common

law judges agreed on many questions of law, and in many
cases, discovered and applied the law in a similar
manner.
Still, the few instances of justices appearing to
have decided a dispute in accordance with their
respective legal tradition may suggest that the two
traditions haven't entirely converged.

It seems, in

these opinions, that the methods for discovering and
applying the law in civil and common law systems have not
185
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Jessup and Morelli's opinions in the

North Sea Cases and Schwebel's opinion in the Phosphate
Lands Case provide evidence for the claim that the
differences between common law and civil law legal
systems persist.

Perhaps Schwebel's decision in the

latter case is more pertinent ·as it is more recent.
Although I am reluctant to draw any further
conclusions regarding this debate because of the
differences between international and domestic law, the
findings here indicate that one might want to take
seriously the arguments of those individuals like
Merryman and Zweigert and Kotz who argue that the common
law and civil law traditions continue to reveal
differences while adopting many of the
methods.

~ther

traditions'

Their positions are supported by the fact that

civil law and common law jurists at the ICJ can agree on
an eclectic method of adjudicating disputes while other
justices at the World Court continue to rely on methods
and techniques of discovering and applying the law that
are characteristic of their respective legal traditions.
Most justices appear to be able and willing to utilize
methods from either tradition while others prefer, at
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least in their decision in these cases, to employ what
they have learned from their legal education and
training.

Are These Findings Important?
Even though this study did not reveal the
significant variables involved in judicial decisionmaking at the ICJ, it has made a contribution to the body
of literature on judicial behavior at the ICJ.

Indeed,

if one wants to understand how decisions are made at the
ICJ, one needs to know how they are not made.

Armed with

the knowledge that certain variables are of less or no
significance to decision-making at the ICJ, scholars and
lawyers interested in how members of the ICJ reach
decisions are that much closer to being able to of fer an
explanation of th.e Court's judgments.

If these

individuals know that the legal tradition under which a
justice at the ICJ was educated and trained does not
determine how she or he will find and apply the law in an
international legal dispute, then one would expect to see
that finding reflected in their arguments.

Although this

study rules out legal tradition as a significant variable
187
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in decision making at the ICJ, one is left answering the
question:

How do these justices decide the cases brought

before them?
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